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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLlll AiD DEFINITION OF TEBMS 
Introduction 
A telensioii new# broadcast in November, 1970, stated that 
even though Senator Muskie was running for re-election in the Senate 
tra:n his native state of Maine, he was also considered to be a 
prominent Demoorat.14 hopeful tor the ncaination £or President in 
1972. 1'he Deaoeratio part.," conaidered Mr. Mukie to be one of the 
prmieina candidates tor th.a 1972 iTeaideutial Haaination. Therefore, 
a hiatorioal critical atudy of this prCEineut, oonteaporer;y, political 
f 11Ul'e vaa undertaken. 
stateunt of the ProJ;?lg 
The pro'blea of the present 1tudy vae to locate, describe, 
aDd analyse the central ideas on the Vi•'bwn War iaeue f arwarded 
� Sen.at.or EdaUDd Muekie u show b7 e. critio&l ��is of the 
Seutol''• political �it.ion on the VietDaJn War issue frcm 1968 to 
aid 1971 aa revealed through his speeches, public statements and 
prese releases. 
The Vii:tnam Wer ve.s one of the strongest issues in the 
l 
2 
1968 ire1Bidentiu.1 Campaign and prClliaed to remain an active iesue 
in the 1972 President1&1 Campaign. Mr. Muskie was a leader in t.be 
::3enete, a le&dar in hio part.y, vaa the Vioe-l'residential Candidate 
tor 1968 and according to the Gallup and Barrie polla vas a f'rollt 
rwmer for the 1972 ?residcmtial Democratic Da!U.Mtion.1 .Becaue 
the Vietnam W&r vas so ourrent and significant aDd becauae Mr. Muskie 
was 8. praninent contender fer tbe 1972 rreaicient.ial nc:m1nat.ion, the 
present study becae important. 
14111tatio;1 ot tbe StWy 
Thie etudy did not include all ot the Dlllleroua apeakere 
vho haYe delivered speecbeB ar llade &t.at.ente ocucern.ing i.tie 
Viet!l&m War iss�. It did not consider the proa and oon• ot the var 
issue in general or include all of the ditterent. issuas vitb 
which Senator Muskie vaa identified. The toous or the stud;y dealt 
onl,- with oonator MU3k1•'& poaition 011 the Vietnea War iesue . Tbe 
preeent st� vu not a rhetoriaal �ais of only oa.e of �nator 
Muskie's epeeobea on the 'lietnaa War isaue but dealt with the 
Senator• s position on tbe apecific iaeu. ot tbe Yietna W&l"J 
tberefore, Dtak1DB t.bia at\ldy iaal»-orienteci in natve. It 0Dl7 
coverec.t opeechea, pre•• rele ... a, aDd at.ateaente from Summer 1968 
to Spring 19'!1. 
1a. W. Apple, ri72 Jiace Hae Begun 'for Muskie: Sta.tr Feels 
His Commitment to ltuu ia lrr•TOeahl•," Ip xon TiM•. (S.ptaber 
21, 1970), p. 32, col. 2. 
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Research into the literature has shown that there are two 
studies 'in progress" relating to Senator Muskie, neither dealing 
with the Vi etnsm '-Jar i saue fr an 1968 to mid 1971. Mr. Dan &Iden 
froM Southern Illinois University and Mr. Judson Ellertson from 
Ghio State University are doing their doctoral dissertations on 
Senator F.dnnmd Muskie. 
Concerning stwies on the Vietil8D wer, research has revealed 
two studies which also corresponded with the present stwy. 
F.dvard Dracbman wrote a dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania 
in 1968 where he discussed the United States policy tovard Vietnam 
from 1940-1945. In this dissertation be traced the beginning of 
the Vietnam conflict through many changes including the United States 
in vol veDlent. 2 
Also in 1968 Stephen Garret from the University of Virginia 
wrote a dissertation entitled, n An Intellectual Analysis of Foreign 
f'olicy Arguments: The Vietnam .Debate." In this study be compllred and 
analyzed Vietnam policy arguments in terms of basic characteristics. 
His whole study vs.a centered around the oontinuing issues confronting 
the developnent of American foreign relations.3 
2 &:lvard Draohman, "U.S. Folicy Toward Vietnam, 1940-1945" 
{unpubliebed f'h.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania., 1968) . 
)Stephen Garret, 11.An Intellect'*1 Analysis of Foreign Policy 
Arguaents: The Vietnam Debate," {unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Virginia, 1968). 
4 
Ch�pt<'>r II - &wiey ot tb.t ui9ratm:e. Thie chapter 
incl\deci A historical backgl'O\IDd ot the U.S. involvewnt in 
Vletn.i::=, 1.he sicnificani i�mll:'u tl;a;t. h&.w beccae dadnant aince 
1968. and Muoki.,..The Ma1L Too re.levant unectc ot Senator Mu:ikie' � 
careor ver8 tNated umer ti. tollowiq be&dingst Frul:r Bf\ck�OllDd 
and F'..ducetiont i>oli ti cal Cerf.�!', : ul:i"..:1 o Cp.inimi and ${).oator Huki• 1 a 
Idmrt.ifj.e1\\ion "11.h � War J:()aue. 
ch&pte.r reported Oil t.i. wol�@tloa er a&t@i-1.e,and tti. M'tbod of 
14"0Cfldure � au well a� t.h. treat.oat. Qf tba cia'\a. 
Cbapt'"'r IV - ia11lto if tM >a:wr rED}>Orted t,b(ll finding.a fr<X!I 
th�� lipplica.tion Cl! t..bi!> apecific ¢r1 terie. to the ·�-o.bla' vuhlio 
stat.et,. � pnse rel .. •.s et S.ut.or Muld.8 tl"m 1968 w aid 1971. 
Cb.apter v - §=mr g1 £Mnl•'w a....tse4 the stll.ly and 
inclWl.. \1Wt eo11i1tluiw ..._ � tlMt wlyaia ot the rea>ultrs. 
s. W.b.U.carapq am tw app4t1'CliOG• followci Cbaptt<>r v. 'Ille 
biblio"°a� provi4aci a lia1t1D1 d iapol'tani. backp-owaid and ooarce 
u.t.G.ri&.ls r.w �- at�. ApP'tailx A inclurl� letiera ot eorrespomonce. 
Ai-i�ndix ll iuollde4 a oow Gt •4'Cll � � lllpllbl.JJsa.d apee bec, preas 
>:elo.._., am\ a�a. 
CHAPTF.R II 
REVIEW OF 'l'H.E'LlTmATURE 
Historica} Be.elcgroupd 9f U. s. 
Inyolytment in Yiet,atm 
The Vietnam War has involved the administrations of 
.Presidents Eisenhowr, Kennedy, Johnson and presently Nixon. 
Each of the four have regarded the Vietnam War isBua according 
to the changing climate of public opinion and their own sense 
of f�esidential responsibility. 
'l'he defeat of the Japanese in World War II created a 
colonial vacuum in Indochina which the French tried unsuccessfully 
to fill. The French military defeat at Dienbienpbu, Mey 8, 1954, 
by inaurgent Vietnaaese forces pr9cipitated the solving of the 
Vietnam problem through the Geneva Conference of 1954. The 
United States became involved in the Vietnam crisis through the 
Geneva Conterence. 
Much of the U.S. initial involvement in the Vietnem 
conflict vu atul veiled in secrecy but American military support 
of tbe government of South Vietnam co1>.tiuued to escalate through the 
Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Fresent policy 
under the Nixon administration was one of announced Vietnamization, 
de-escalation and w1 tbdrawal. 
5 
l"nGident Jobaaoa felt it we.a nec•aee.ey 1a l96S-l966 to 
1aoreue t� U.S. toroeia 1D Vi�. b tot.al allied etrrengt11 
Ad bt>oaM eo extell.aivo that. it bild bE:�ui termed �a tull-acalo wer 
•aehin& ln ar.a area ball the aize � 0&.llfand.a�;.il la e'1'pj>ert ot 
hia eeeala1.1oa polio7 lTeaiclent Jolmaon »aid, 
We h&'f• ottacd •aotiatidD#, 6l'ld ve ban fought harcl, 
Wit ocnrapoul.7, oa lmteailiar terr! kJ7, w1 tb an 
incre&.liDi camnit.raent ot plan&s, sh!pa, e.nd grenlf1 tnrceu, 
all Chaiped to bring \be var to ead vlth boa.ol'. 
•om•r 1cpWM &.lt 
Tba nen aipit1oaat ehel2g• vh:S.eh took. pl�ee in t.be pollc7 
a.eking ot the Vlcbea \la wa• the IC'f'•ber, 19681 bcabin& halt 1.eawd 
bl' rneident. J�. The tabing halt seemed to be a D90eaaity, 
aocordirJI to S..tora 0.-Ding and Beae•r. 
li>and �' 11@\Rlll .Bw lit vot In .• H0{ %9 Qet Qj.\, 
(ltev torlta at.bene•• 1968), p. 58. 
211Gwvd Zina, DGD•• Thi IQc1o ot tAtWnnJ., (hatCIU 
a.aeon Ph3a, 1967), p. 121. 
7 
United State a mill tary involvement in Vietnam is open­
ended and unless there is soms sort of de-escals.tion on the 
part of the United States, the extent of future Ul'lited States 
military involvement will be determined by North Vietnmn snd 
not by the United statee. U.S. Jlilitarr escalation in Vietnam 
instead of stopping Communi.Slt, as contended by its e.dvocates, 
actually benefits the Soviet Union and Communist China which, 
vi thout committing a single m<!n to combat th1'3re, see more 
8lld more U.S. armea forces engaged in cc:abat with a primitive 
peasant people and m�e and more U.S. re sources diverted to meet military needs. 
In the beginning of October, 1968, the vq vas opened for a 
ccaplete cessation of the banbing of the 5orth. The administration 
had vorked out a fomule. under which the United States would halt the 
bonbing as a step toward peace, expecting in return that the abuses 
of the demilitarized zone as vell a.a Vietcong or Horth Vietnamese 
attacks on the cities or other populated areas vould cease and that 
Hanoi would 
• • •  e11ter prcnptly into serious political discussions 
that included the elected government of South Vietnam. On 
October Jl, the President announced that aa ot 8 A.M. fridq, 
Noveaber l, be was ordering a canpleta ces�ation of all the 
United States sir, naval, and artillery baabardment of North 
Vietnam. 4 
The bcnbing halt vas termed '�a. first step in unilaters.l de­
escalation. t15 
Nixon' s Uetpemj zation J·o1icz 
The principal question that was asked in Jenuary, 1969, 
waa whether Hixon would move still more rapidly to de-escalate 
the war and witbdrav American troopa or vhetber he would proceed 
3Ernest Gruening and Herbert Bea.ser, Yietnam f2l;J.y, 
(Washington D.C.: National Press Inc., 1968), p. 375. 
4lienr;y Graff, Aiw Tue@day Cabinet, (Hew Jersey: Prentice­
Hal1, Inc., 1970), PP• 157-158. 
5MarJ .KcCartey, lii·noi, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and 
World, Inc., 1968), p. 95. 
s 
elowly' enough to �rmi t tt-.e o-aretul �Viatnudcation1i of too 
quitf: :d.tllar to bis predecessor. 
Crig1ntlly �8.PY o�rs believod that Nuon vantcd to 
of 19% vhet�v&l' the circnmstances, �h.11e others contended be \lal..> 
planning to move 1tcre ulovly' aTJd ge."Up the vi thdra111.LI.� to tlw 11o•e� 
aede by tbtt C0!11111mtiat�. 6 
Vrecidieint N.iXQn h&� deacri bed the e«i aence Of' hl s Vieto-1 zation 
Object1 YC being the tro...�3fer � &round OCllbat rolea frca .F.aet1can 
!ho dcv�� or µrogreefJ in building up and tr&1Dint: 
South Vietn&at!"9 !oreea so that thBy CM te!rn ov-�r fl'<D 
1iMrtc&ae; tbe 9MIV'• maiato:rumce ot a redu.eod le.,l ot 
1'1iil1tery �c-tiv:l.ty; Nld pl"Ogl"$6S at the Peria talluJ. 
The r'rc.sider:rt alone, ot cour-s•, bas the power ot int.l-pr\:tifli 
whether or � th�se conditions er� being mot, end mor� 6pocitical.17 
wh&ther the exte-nt 1 � sufficient to ware.Gt cOD1.i.lro.ed vi thdraw.l. 
In fact, with �opect to th9 eecODll prepoaitioa, dwiag the tirst 
halt ot 1970 the criterion ot tbi) level at emar •1lit8!"7 actirlty 
was expanded geograpbicsll.7 b&yond. Vietn.ll and aeMle to apply to 
6aobert. Sbaplu, 4.M Bo� (ESW W@=Viet;'• 19'S-l97o, 
(Nev Yorks Harper and Rov, 1970:, ?P• 2�0, J2G. 
7 $aa Brown and 1on Acklaad, ed., Wlly A£s Vp StiJ,J. ip Jittw, 
(lev Yorlu Rand• House, 1970), p. 2S. 
9 
Laos and Cambodia as vell. Vietnamization ve.s not meant to be a 
peace plan. Rather, it postulatea continuation of an essentially 
military approach to the problems of South Vietnam, in a wey which 
the administration hoped would be acceptable to most Americans. 
It was meant to relieve J.:inerica.ns of feelings of responsibility 
for the var, by appearing to shift the fighting fran U.S. to 
South Vietnamese forces even though a decisive role was actuaJly 
to be played by American troops and pilots for years to cane. 
It vas hoped that the shift in ground cot!bat roles from Americans 
to Vietnamese would be subste.nti�.l enough to keep U.S. casual ties 
dO'Wll to a level that a majority of the American public would regard 
as tolerable. 
Shortly after he took office, President Nixon ruled out 
a preoipitous ft.merican disengagement and left the time schedule 
for disengagement undefined. In support or his open-ended vitb.­
draval policy , in November, 1969, President Nixon claimed that 
a precipitous .American 1odthdre.wal would v.t.thout question promote 
reckleaeness in the councils or those great powers vho have not 
yet abandoned their goals o� world conquest which would prestm1ably 
lead to turther conquests. 
It the level of enemy activity significantly increases 
we might have to adjust. our timetable accordingly. U I 
conclude that increaeed enemy action jeoperdizes our 
rama1ning forces in VietnBlD, I shall not hesitate to take8 strong aud effective measures to deal with the situation. 
Open-Eprleci Versus Fixed Daj;e lij(hdrwa1 }'oligx 
Due to disenchantment by the .American people, there ha.a 
been stro� controversy concerning the wi tbdrawal system. Nix.on' s 
8 
JW., p. 7. 
open-ended vi.tMraval-Vietnsmiztl.tion policy h&.s been cc.npared to 
the itQJ'ltediate witbdraval with e. fixed tinl¢tablo. "The sanity of 
unilateral ,Ji thdre:wal is that it Jllakee th1D end of thCt var i.Dd&�ndcnt 
ot aDTone•s consent but our ovn. It is clean cut, it is swif't, it 
i� r1ght"9 is a sample Of tho slogan eupported b'/ Nixon oppoaition. 
iile.lter 1..1p11!lan has au:ime.rized vhat he considered the embiguity and 
confll:lion in current Viotnam policy. "This is just about the firet 
tim� in the history of warfere that a nation thollint it could prevail 
by withdrawing canbet troop6 and I'eQuciD& ita military presence. 11 
Lippman contended tliat the Nixon adminiatration was uot seeking full 
disen�gement s.t all but \raS trying to bt.q- petf bnce 6lld. endurance 
tram the Amer.lean peopl() for a.a indefinitely .l.oag occupation in 
South Vietnsm.10 Geor� McGovern ru:ivocatGd, "We ne6d a eleart 
unequi vooal policy whl.ch vi.ll lead to a. syatem.atio termination or 
our invoJ.vement in the War.'' Ifo offered an amendtuant in which he 
promis�d a flprogram of witbdravo.1 which punctuates the urgenoy and 
necessity of an orderly American disengagement. It set.a out the 
eort ot unequivocal polioy needed. t.o bring to a close the sed 
epioode in .berict.n Ilistocy. 11
ll Bis progrsa for disengagement had 
three eeuentis.l rcaquiaites: (l) a total withdrawal of American 
forc�s, (2) ail all."lOUllOldd aJld date for th� completion o! v.itbdraval 
&Dd (.3) ccanplotion of v.l th.J.rawal &t an oer 17 time. 
9 Zinn, P• 1S5. 
10 Brew and Ackland, p. 15. 
11 11&4·, P• 126. 
11 
lJ"iaoner-of-War Issue 
'I'he most recent issue in withdrawal policy i� the prisoners-
of-wer issue. The l rc:sident called for immediate release of al  
prisoners of war held throughout Indochina, irrespective of 
progress tovard agreement on any oth�r items. According to 
John N. Irw:ln, Under Secretary of State, ha.d this proposal beon 
accepted by the other side, our men could be home now, and the 
Vit tnamese prisoners heJ.d tr..roughout Indochina could also be home.12 
The administration believed strongly that a fixed timetable and 
announcement wou.ld not serve the interests of securing an orderly 
end to '.merican involvement in the war or an early relea.se of our 
prisoners. The argunsnt hna been stated that if a reo.sonable date 
for U.S. total 'Withdrawal "Was set, the North Vietnamese would 
be willing to cease firing against U.S. troops and release our FOw's. 
This argument ignored several important points. John N. 
Irwin, Under Secretary of State , believed that as long aa the 
cease-fire was not universal, our men would still be exposed to enemy 
fir� because of their support for the South Vietnamese forces. So 
far, the .President's call for a total cease-fire had been refused by 
the other side. A:so, in all their statements, including those made 
at the most recent session of the taris talks on April 291 1971, the 
other side had limited itself to a cOIIID'.itment to discuss th� release 
of our pri aoners if we announced a reasonable withdrawal date. They 
continue.lly linked actual release of prisoners of war, �s opposed to 
mere discussion or the quest1on1 with the settlement of the var 
War111 
(June, 
12Jobn N. Ir.dn II, ''Vietnam: Ending U.S. Involvement in the 
Cun-jut Forei&n folicY, Department of State FUb.Lications 8589, 
1971 • 
12 
on the basis of their political demands. These statements by the 
North Vietnemeee end their southern supporters, plus their stee.df ast 
refusal to give any interlocutor a commitment to do more tht>Jl 
discuss the FOW question if we ennounced a withdrawal date, suggested 
that announcement of such a date on our part would be met with 
demands for further concessions rather th81l the release of our men.13 
AB can be witnessed by the exem:i.nation of the controversy 
over issues end policy changes identified here, there were mal'l3' 
points of rlew. However, the Vietnam War has divided .American 
public opinion as much aa my major political issue of the twentieth 
century. The range of opinion has represented 'the extr•es as well 
as the middle gro\md. "Hawks" who have felt the of'ticial .Admin-
i�tration policy was weak to the "Doves" who have advocated immediate 
disengagement of American influence in Southeast Asia. 
Ty¢cal of the "Bavkish'' response wu the statement by 
General Curtis Le May, retired Air Force Chief' of stafft 
The United States must be \d.ll1ng to continue banbiJl.i 
until every work of man in North Vietnem is gone. We 
should bomb the irrigation system on which food production 
largely depends, and every facto17 and never ending.so 
long aa there are two bricks still stick togetber • .l.4 
Viewing the situation fran the opposite Tievpoint, David Schoenbrun, 
news anaJ.y-st and commentator for C.B.S., characterized our involvement 
in Vietnam ae tragic: 
The tragic story of hov ve got involved in Vietnam and 
how we then got deeper end de-eper into the death-pits of 
that country, trcn the first cautious Eisenhower dispatch or 
aid to Kennedy's less prudent but still noncamnittal dispatch 
13,!W. 
l4"Vietnam Ieeues, '' Catholic Wm;:ld. CCVI (March, 1968) 1 
262-265. 
of advisors, to the fateful Americanization of the ver 
by Lyndon Johnsy�, to the now que1Stionable Nixon 
ad!!!ini�tration. 
taiother position was posed by Arthur �hle�inger as be gave 
u call for unity, Md R$Sertf.\d that rnutucl. truest !lll!ODf; .AJl'lericans 
��s essenti�l in t� Vi�tnam controversy. 
For �!he��r tbe outcome of tho Vietnam debate or of 
later debates that miq de.rken our future, the essentio.l 
thing is to �es<;rvA .mutue.1 trust �mong ourzfllves as 
.Amoricans. Lot u.s remember that those vho take a 
different p<>flj.tion Wh(;tth<�r they Yruat to ov11cuate Sdgon 
or bomb Hanoi � also be actueJ.ed by honorable and 
p�triotic motives may whatever their dcgrecG of error, 
btill bava a genuine concern for peace end freedom • 
.Lst w: always dil'lting\rl.sh betWGen dise.grP.r::nent a."ld 
<!iolcyalty, between opposition e.nd tree.eon. Let us 
never forget thnt complictJted µroblem� (!en 'be r�solved 
only by reasoned analy6ia; and that the insist�nce 
en r�ason is tho rina.1 hoDo of de�ocrst1c soo1ety. 
Ir ve can r�embt:r this, in vho.tever direction and 
deci51ons and deatiny ta!i:e ue, we can �aserv·., e.nd /, 
cherish our fUIJd�ntal unity Of purpo�e QS .AJnfsl'iCB.np •. � 
MM§kie-Th� Man P'aw11y �g.gkg:roWld 
Nil F,ducnt•sn 
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F.dmund Sixtus Muskie Wti� bcrn in Ruriford, ?Wne, Msrcb .28, 
1914. Though quiet a5 r; child, he 8t111 manug£:d to impress people 
as Cl. boy vbo \U\S deetim�d for �uccens. .:\ friend of the feml7 said 
the.t he thought that wl1<:n F.,d grew up, :t�e vouJ.d oi ther bEs a. biebop 
or f"resident of the United St.ates.17 
1-i'uslde graduated frca RUl!l.ford High 3chool in 1932, attended 
&tee College, where he va.a rbi Beta Kappa end a niember of the 
15 60 Schoe.abrun, P• • 
16Schlesinger, Bj.ttlr H•riitl•• (Boston: Bougbton.-Mif'flin 
Co., 1967), P• 126. 
17u.�., Q9QBte'1oi2f1a:l. Recor4, (Septemb�r 16, 1968), CXIV, 
EZIOS?. 
debating team. He graduated from &>te s College, cum laude in 
,8 
1936 • ..i. Afte r this step in his life he enrolled at Cornell Lew 
School where he received his I.J.B degree three yee:rs later.19 
Upon graduation from Cornell, Muskie went to New York to be 
interviewed by a Wall Streft law firm, but instead of pursuing 
that idea be opened a l:llllall le.w firni in :·le.terville, Maine. 
Shortly after, World War II called him to duty. He served as an 
engineering and deck officer on a. destroyer escort in the 
United States Navy.20 
1-oliticel C!"reer 
He consi de red himself 11sober11 about politics. He thought 
that politics vas not a. business in which one could plan very far 
ahead, much less aim for e glitter ing plE·.cs in the national 
spotligbt.21 MU!lkie said, "The principl e objective of my whola 
political career in public life has been to give ev0ryone an equal 
22 chancG to improve their 11 ve s. 11 
When he returned to Waterville in 1945, after thr.:; war, 
he sought to pick up vbere he had left off in building a lav 
practice but abandoned it a year later to run for the state.! 
18susan She€han, "Muskie of M�ine11, New York Times, 
(Nov embe r 22, 1970), Sec. VI, p. J.JO. 
19 
U.S., Copgres@iongl Record, (September 16, 196$), CXIV ,F.27087. 
20Ibid. 
2111F.dmund Muskie," Senior Scb9lastic, (September 27, 1968), 9. 
22 
Steven Roberts, "F.dmund Sixtus Muskie 'l'akea the Low Key Road," 
New York Till.es, (October 28, 1968), Sec. VI, p. 321 col. J. 
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logi�latur�. Local re�ocratic leaders in search of fresh candidates 
, 
for the offic� epproeched him and he quickly a0cepted. In 1946, 
be was aloctcd to the office of the Maine House of Representatives 
an'1 began his political career.23 In 1947, he ran f�r Meyor of 
Waterville and lost tho only election in his �areer previou s to the 
1968 elGction. He Wt'!.� re-elected to the state legislature in 1948 
t.?ld 1950. In 1948 he became the floor leeder of the handful of 
Democrats. boon after his second re-electlon to the leg'lslature, 
he resigned to beca5e Maine Director of the Office of Price 
Stabillz{l.tion.24 He reoigned this position the naxt year to became 
t·!ainc 1 s Democru.tic Nationtl COl'Uni tteemG.n. In a wna.11 Republican 
dominet�d state like Maine, this post was not too honorable and 
often lerui to the nomination for governor or senator. 25 In 1952, 
he was approached by a group of praainout Democrats to run for the 
governorship, but he declined because he felt that the state party 
organization was too weak. In 1954, he had decided to run for 
Congress when the same group of aen again urged him to make a bid for 
the statehouse. He reluctantly agreed to try.26 Muskie, defeated 
the incumbent, to become Maine's first Democratic governor in two 
decades. As the Nation' 1 first Polish-kllerican governor, he was 
invited to attend various .hilaaki dq oeremonies anci Kosciusko 
2311Ecbnund Muskie, 11 p. 9. 
24u.s., Congressional Hecgrd, (September 16, 1768), GXIV, 
f27087. 
25 
Martin Nolan, 11Huskio of lo1aine, n l'hc Rep2rt;r, XX.XVII 
(July 13' 1967)' p. 44. 
26 
U.S., Congreµsi2£41 Recctg, (September 16, 1968), CXIV, 
F..27087. 
2? 
festivals. In 1956, h�1ren again for governor and received 
the largest vctc Qver given a Maine governor. In 1958, MUskie 
decided to c:h!>.llenge Republica.n incumbent Frederick Fayne for 
the Senate. 'lhough th� underdog at the out3et, he overwhelmed 
fayne and becs:.:.o the first Democratic senator ever elected by 
the ·1·eonle of Maina.28 He ran a.gain for senator in 1964 ruld 
1970. �uskie was the Democratic nominee for Vice-President of 
r--c 
the United States in 1968.�1 
In his first weeks in Washington in 1959, he defied 
oue of the cepitol's most powerful men, Senate Majority Leader, 
Lyndon Johnson. Johnson asked all the freshmen sen�tors for 
their �uppor� in beating back the biennial liberal attempt to 
16 
change the Senete rules to weake� the grip filibustering southern 
senetors could exercise over the body's affairs. Muskie did not 
support Johnson; thus Joh!lsou gnvs h:i.u1 the last three committee 
choices which vere Banking and Currency, Public Works, and 
Government O�re.tions rather t.han Muskie's preference of Foreign 
Relti.tions. JO '!his incident was beneficial to Muskie because he 
U:J�d it wisely. 'Mee in 1965 he passed up the opportunity to 
advance in party leadership because of his deference to the vi.shes 
of others. In 196?, he passed up an opport'lmi.ty to be in the 
27 Nolan, 9. 44. 
28u.s., Congreaeioaal Record, (September 16, 1968), C1IV, 
F.:27087. 
29senator &imund Muskie, Biographical Data, Senate Office 
Bui ldiug, (March, 1961). 
30u.s., Congressional Recorg, (Septfo)rober 16, 1968), CA.IV, 
F2.7087. 
.. 
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third ranking post of the p!'rty hierarcy. He se.id he was too 
involved in projects in the three committees initially assigned 
to him • .:n 
Public Ql)inion 
Because of Muskie' a 1:Linco!neuque11 method and style of 
handling politics he has obtained variou s kinds of public canment. 
In the Senate he was known for a clean a.lld deliberative manner, 
a tendency to speak softly and briefly and a degree· of modesty 
\Dlusual in a chember of such towering ambitions. Senator Mansfield 
spoke 0£ him 8.6 a "man who esche'As publicity, works hard, and has 
geilled a well deserYed reputation among hiB colleagues for 
integrity, fair dee.ling and cffet�tivcnoss. 1:32 But Senator Mansfield 
also �;aid he lacked "charisma and oherm1:. 33 
A reporter traveling vi.th Muskie found biJl M\lllable to 
generate the kind of excitement which normall.J° surrouxxls a 
Presidential contender.1134 Similar to this another reporter said, 
"Muskie's trouble is that he is essentially an introvert running 
for an ert.roTert' s job. Though tbo�tful �bout ideas and humanity, 
he seems on.able to get involved with flesh and blood people.1135 
31�. 
32.DWi· 
33J.F. Riobard, "The Remaking of Muskie," Tbe Natiop, 
CCXII, (February 22, 1971), p. 236. 
34�. 
35�. 
Identification With the War Issue 
In September, 1967, Muskie went to Vietnam at fresident 
Johnson's request to observe the election that was held to 
legitimize President Ng'Zfen Vsn Thieu' a regime in Sr.igon. By 
January, 1968, the blood shed he.d begun to worry Muskie to the 
point where he privately wrote to the President and a.eked him 
to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as an effort to open peace 
negotiations. He vent to the Chica.go Convention and became 
involved in the struggle over the Vietnam plaDk when one of 
Humphrey's men came to him and asked him to help in trying to 
acccmodate the ha'Wks and doves. By this time the banbing issue 
had become a symbol, a. kind of moral watershed, of where a man 
stood on Vietnam.36 
Muskie was asked to def end the strong Vietnamese plank 
at the 1968 Democratic Convention. Muskie recalled. 
When Humphrey asked me to organize the speakers 
for the majority plank, I took the lead speech. I 
thought that although we ha.dn' t been able to change 
the words or the plank to the extent sOJile of us 
would have liked, I could give the words an inter... 
pretation that would aocomodate both groups so that 
we could have a Vietnam policy eve1'7one could live 
with. Words became symbols to people, but as I see 
it, the �ference in the planks was a matter of �ems.tics. 
Since 1969, he has called for an announced schedule for the 
withdrawal of all U.S. military forces from Indochina. 
36sheehan, Se VI 13.3 c. ' P· • 
J?l,W. 
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Although he had taken a position in the 1968 Democratic 
Convention and he made a statement concerning his 'Withdraval 
position in 1969, yet "Senator Muskie has been slow to step out 
on his own .  Cn Vietnalh, in particular, he he.s bec;:n exceedingly 
cautious in �970, e�en to the point of refu�ing to speak on 
Vietnam. 11.38 liovever, the public unvt:iling ci:.?M.� in M}!rch, 1970, 
before the National Press Club. Se:no.tor Mu��kio finally came 
19 
out with his first major statement against the war. The opening 
round of the nev campaign �hasa of isaU1D-orieut�d speeche� to 
key a\Xliences vae eucoessful. 39 Finally in associ<.1tion with his 
identification vith the war issue he \las branded, 11Mr. Gurb 
the Military
. 114° 
38u.s. , Congressiona1 fteoorsi, (March 11, 1970) ,  �-v:vr, 
F..1-854. 
39 Richard. P• 2J6. 
M·· 'Sheehan, Sec. VI, p .  29 .  
CHAPTER III 
METHOD OF PROCE.DURJ� ;J�D l{i\TERIALS USED 
§election of MateriaJ.s 
The selection of the criteria vs.a accanplished in several 
steps. Several rhetorical. models were revieVBd. It was observed 
that the models provided by f'arrish,1 Baird,2 Wrage,3 Hochmuth­
Nichols, 4 e.nd Croft, 5 for the most �;srt were designed to deal 
primarily as a rhetorical. aMlysia of one specific speech 
delivered by one certain person, on a specific occasion, but the 
present study was intended to be issue-oriented thus, dealing 
with a ntmiber of speeches, press releases, and statements ,  
covering the period of time from 1968 to mid 1971 .  It became 
apparent that it was not possible to a:::'lY any one rhetorical 
\1axfield Wayland Farrish, u.nd �.arie Hochmuth Nichols, 
. !Jnericen Speeche�. New York: Longmans, Green 6.lld Co. , 1954. 
2A.  Craig Baird, tunerio§n Public .Addresses. 17/t0-195.?. 
Nev York: McGraw-Hill Book Co. , 1956. 
3Ernest J. Wrage, 
end Intellectuel History " ,  
XXXIII (December, 1947 ) .  
"Public .tiddress, A Stu:iy of Social 
Ihe Quarterly Journel. of Speech, 
�ie liochiznrth, A Hi@�2U 100 Cril42iS111 pf ,Americw 
Public Address . New York: Longmana, Green Co. , 1955. 
. 5 JU.bert J. Crof't, "The Functions of Rhetorical Criticism11 , 
Ilw Ql!arj;erf[ Jownal. of' Spepcb, XLII (October, 1956) . 
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model to this study. Howver, a study of theee rhetorical 
models gave insight into sane questions that later developed 
into the ori teria used far analysis. Twenty four questions vere 
initially developed . Due to repetition and questioM that went 
beyond the realm of this study, the twenty four que$tiona wre 
21 
canbined and ineorpcreted into three major questions which became 
the criteria for a..11,.i.lysie .  It wa8 belleTed that the three 
question criteria vould better suit the purposes of the study 
than vould any one rhetorical model. The criteria us9d -were 
a• f'ollows: 
1. Wb.&t wre the central ideas presented by Muskie 
concerning his position on the Vietnam War issue'l 
2. In what wey vere Muskie ' s  central ideas supported 
in order to ju:.;tify lrl.3 position on the 1ssuc? 
3 .  1-lc.ve m:::..jor pol:l.cy changes effected revisions or 
mod1£ications if any, of his positions? 
The speeches, press releases, and statements that vere used began 
with the date that Senator Muskie was first identified vith the 
Vietnam War issue to March 1, 1971. 
MethoC) gf ?roce<lure 
Letters vere written to Senator Muskie, the Senate Office 
Building in Washington, D. C. , and to his Preas SecretOl"'/ requesting 
all speeches,  press releases and statements made by Senator Muskie 
concerning the Vietnam Wer issue tran 1968 to mid 1971. Ji..s a 
supplement to any materials received fran those sources, the 
Nev York Tiae&, Vital Speeches of tb@ Day, and CAAgressiona1 Recom 
22 
provided many extra speeches, press releasee and statsents 
that deelt \dth the Vietnam War issue. A total of 40 speeches, 
press releases, and statements vere used for analysis. 
It was not possible to check the speeohes for textual 
accuracy since no audible transcripts were available. It wa.s 
assumed that the text of s.11 the speeches, press releases, and 
statements wre as accurate as could be determined. 
Many rhetorical models vere previewd. These models gave 
insight to same questions that should be answered in an analysis 
of Senator Muskie ' s  apeeclies, press releases, and statements 
concerning the Vietnam War issue. A three point criteria was 
then devised. 
'l)"ee:tment of th! Data 
The speeches, prese releases , end statements were 
compiled and then arranged cbronologically. The criteria were 
applied to �3ene.tor Muskie's public positi.on(s) on the Vietnam War 
during the period from the SllllUr ot 1968 through the Spring of 
1971 by enalyzing the scope of hie position as applicable to 
eaoh cri terlon in order to locate, deseri be ,  and IUllUyze the 
central ideas on the Vietnam War issue f orvarded by Senator Muskie 
fran 1968 to present. 
CHAPTER IV 
RF.SU�'lS OF THE �TUDY 
lntrod:uct1@ 
The problem addreseed by this st\¥1.y was to loaate, 
describe ,  and analyz.e tbs centre.l icieu of the Vietnam War is:sue 
forvarded by $enator Muskie, as ahown by a critical &nalysis of 
the �nator' s  politioal pronouncements on the Vietnam War iosue 
fran 1968 to mid 1971. The three point criteria. prsaeutf!d in 
Chapter Ill were cGJls14ered a �t-.er measuring inotr\J'ilent for 
the preeent et� tbaJ& vou..Ld an.y one of the rhetoricul modela.; 
previ�wed since the focus vas issue-oriented over an ex�nded 
period of time. 
The dat.a for tbe s't\rly were BlTtmged cbrono1og1cally then 
a.nalyzed by each point of the three criteria. T'bo imalyeis revealed 
the results reported in this cllaptsr. 
l. '!he United dtatee ahould support a negotiated 1ettlement. 
A. 'Ihe wer should be settJ.ed by a political aettlement 
and not by a Jlili tary victory . 
23 
B .  We must camnit oareelvea to disen.gaganMmt, w 
mu.st 1mp1e-.Jr!ent thet conmdtrne11t b-'J tnC!lllS of u 
ph�!tt'!d pl�'Pl of ��thtlr�Yal pllred to � timetEble ,  
r.nd 1n plm:miag thftt t1motnble '� r"'USt r.eoi· to 
;irr.!.'lc� tb� proc�ccts f C!' � ::it'lgoti.: t. d :-;?t tl.::�(\nt. 
c. �iecretary C·3.!laral U Thant shoW.d be asked to 
Her1P. tS.r. t:!.\d f�tor amonr P.11 the £ r ot1 en!': of 
.South V1etna:! in ��tt.int the :.;tf..g:J fo-r s. 
!)G� itice1 3�ttl�nt or th� w�r. 
n. fl bcJnbing hRlt ShOUJ.d bP at'tdf,t�d S.6 B. sign Of 
"'� vi 1.lingn.:ias to negc-ti�.ts . 
E .  c�'.leuJ.at\:.ld. ri sks abould be teken in tbo l\rea::i.: 
Of fl. e��r.Jf'-fire, withdrawal Of forcns , 
��1tabli3m�m. er c.n interim govorn.�ent, ol1gih111ty 
t.o vote r:nd e11.gibil1ty tc run fo-: officn. 
F .  Tho only way ve vould achieve tbt: goe.l of th1., 
retm"n of our pri �011('.r5 of ·,mr w:.is tb:-ou� c. 
negotia.t.00 'Jettlement. 
2. �n.igon aho�d not ht;ve veto !><>WT& over our efforta to 
explore ruw l,roys t� end th.� war. 
) .  Viotnomization policy ve.e not the road to pe(:oe in 
Vi,�tnt'.m. 
Saw.:1tor Munkie the mo�t dcsdnf\Ut was :td. n  i n�ist�ncei.� for 8 n�goti�t.e:d 
dev13;loped 1n 1968 . Dur-1.ng the thirty month time period cov�Ted by 
this at\ldy be baii spoken in �1:.•ar of this position on twenty two 
occe.sions, in Rddition to the msb&r Of U.m�s he spolce" en the 
Terious supper-ting ieouee. 
t�ugu!t 19, 1968-DemoCTatio F1 atfcm Co:maitta<-: 
r.uguet 29, 1968-M.tljonty I1�nk 
e-eptember ll, 1968--tJnivel"�ity of Notrt' Deme 
jeptat>b!ii!?" 11, 1961!-Indiarmpolio 
Septeaba l.8, 1968-CommomreeJth G!.ub--�n Francisco 
October 15., 1969"-Be.tee Gollop 
October 16, 1969-Uni?Wci.ty ot Tenneseo� 
Nove!llber 3, 1969-Congref:s 
Nove�ber 7, J 969--Ccngrese 
November 14, 1969-Dinner in Honor of Congres�f:.11 
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J effery Cchel;n-Oakland, C�Jifornia 
.March 5 ,  i97r --.National l-'re�� Club 
March 26, 1970--Ccngress 
April 3 ,  1970--Congress 
April 10, 1970--Congress 
tle..y 11, 1970--Congress 
MAy 1 2 ,  1970--Colby College 
July 5 ,  1 970--New York Times 
&?.ptemb�r 22, 197C--Congr� �G 
January 23, 1971--California Democratic State Convention 
.January Jl , 1971-University of Hartford 
February 23, 1971--University of iennsylvania 
'I'ypical of. his position \las the statement made in a major speech 
before the lfational 1-re�s Club, March 5 ,  1970. 11I believe that 
an end to the wsr and an end to our involvement in the war can be 
1 brought about only through a negotiated settlement. 11 , 
Sene.tor Mus�ie supported bis contention that a negotiated 
settlement waa needed by developing six sub-points. One of theze 
was the position that a political settlement was the answer to 
ending the war rather than a military victory. lie repes.ted 
frequently that.- 1·r�s1dent Nixon pref erred a mi-Li tary victory. In 
that respect Nixon� he charged, was like Joh..�son. Muskie reitereted 
the importance of the political settlement as the only answer to 
ending the war. He supported this position on eight occasions. 
September 11 , l968--UDi.ve�eit7 of Not�e Dame 
October 16, 1969-Uniftr•ity of Tennessee 
November 7, 1969--Congr�ss 
�fovember 14, 1969-Dinner in Honor of Congresm.an 
Jeffery Cohelan-Ou.kls.nd, c�J.ifornia 
March 5 ,  19?0--Nationc;.l Press Club 
March 26, 1970-Congress 
May il, 19?0--Congresa 
July 5 ,  1970--New York Times 
1 U.S. , Qongressional Record. (March 5 ,  ::970 ) ,  CXVI, 53094. 
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Typical of the eight times he called for a political settlement 
and not a military victory was the address delivered at the 
University of Notre Deme, September 11, 1968 . 
• • •  the war, should not be settled by military victory, 
but by negotiations to end the fighting. The terms of 
the settlement would be the product of all2disagreement and controversy; this is the American way. 
His position (Jn setting a definite de.te for withdrawal was-
another sub-point of a negotiated settlement . His position 
became stronger beginning in early 1969 vhen he said he had 
many questions as to whether that route would be the best one 
to ptn"sue. He becmne very strong on the issue in October, 1969 , 
s.nd has addressed himself in support of this position seventeen 
times. 
October 1 5 ,  1969--Bates College 
October 16, 1969--University of Tennessee 
Ncvember 3 ,  1969--Congress 
November 7, 1969--Congress 
November 14, 1969--Dinner in Honor of Congressman 
Jeffery Cohelan--Oakland, California 
March 5 ,  1970--National Press Club 
March 26, 1970--Conuess 
.April J, 1970--Congx"ese 
April 10, 1970--Congress 
May 11 , 1970--Congress 
May 12, 1970--Colby College 
May 17, 1970--State of Maine Democrs.tic Convention 
July 5 ,  1970--New York Times 
January 23, 1971--California Democratic State Convention 
January 31,  1971--University or Hart!'ord 
February 20, 1971--New Republic 
February 23, 1971--University of Pennsylvania 
Typical on his position on withdrawal vas the statement he 
delivered at Bates College1 Leviston, Maine ,  October 15, 1969 . 
I believe ve must disengage our forces-.-in an orderly 
Wfq as soon as poseible. I vould hope that our witbdre:wal 
2 Cl£11'ton Knowles, "Muskie Deplores Discord on W'c.r, 11 � 
York Times, (September 12, 1968) , p. 42, col. 1 .  
program could pave the vsy for a political settlement 
between the social and political tendencies in South 
Vietnam. To facilitate this objective, I have 
advocated that we propoee a standstill ceaee-fire to 
open the way for negotiated settlement and a quick 
end to the fighting end killing. 3uch an offer could 
be accompaniP.d by a reduction in our offensive 
operations . 3  
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The essence of his statement on vitbdraval, January 23, J 9'71, 
at the Galifornia State Democratic Con•ention expressed his 
concern that en open-ended policy vas only a continuation ot 
the war and was dangerous tor .Aznerican troops and prisoners or 
war. That the United States should set thair ow vi thdraval 
procedure independent ot Saigon and should set a definite 
withdrawal date, vas the eesence ot hie withdrawal position in 
his address at the Uninrslty ot Pennsylvania, Pebruary 2), 1971. 
Senator Muakie recOl!lliended that the administration ask 
Secret81'Y General U Thant to se�ve as mediator at the Paris 
peace talks four tlllea. 
November 1.4, 1969--Dinner in Honor of Congressmen Jeffery 
Cohelan-Oakland, California 
March 5 , 1970--National Preas Club 
April 10, 1970--Congress 
May 11 , 1970--Congreee 
He believed the peace talks were not resulting in an agreement 
partly because a qualified person was not present to mediate between 
waring parties. Be thought U Thant could close the symbolic but 
important protocol gap thet was presently standing in the Wfl3' of 
negotiations. Typical of hie statements, was the one he delivered 
at a dinner given in honor of Congressman Jeffery Cohelan in 
Oakland, Californitt, November 14, 1969. "I believe that 
3Edmund Muskie, ''Letter to Maine, u Senate Office Building, 
Washington D . C .  (October 28, 1969 ) .  
Secretary General U Thant should be asked to serve as a mediator 
among all the factions of South Vietnam in setting the stage for a 
negotiated settlement of the war . "4 
Senator Muskie ' s  position on the bombing halt has changed 
over the period or time covered in this analysis. Research revealed 
this change was represented by a politically based inconsistency 
in his private and public position. First he wrote a letter to 
President Johnson in J anuary, 1968, asking him to halt the bombing. 
In early August, 1968, he stated that e. premature halt might be 
risky. Later in August, he made thi s statement to the Democratic 
1�1a.tform Committee . 111 believe a bombing halt at this time, 
as a test of North Vietnam' s  intention as a further demonstration 
of our willingness to take the illltiative toward peace, me.y be 
juetified. 115 ADd on November 2. 1968, vhen the bQmbing halt was 
announced he reiterated, �the action was a nece•sit," elMi waa 
the first s'iep to ending the var. "6 
Tb4t idea of te.ld:ag "calolil.ated risks" wae appealing to 
Mwskie and in the tille period coTered in the aneJ.7sia be addressed 
thia issua on three oceaaiou. 
Septeaber 11, 1968-Univereity of Notre D8lH 
September lS, 1968--Canmonwealth Club 
Oetober 30, . 1968--.rican Hotel 
�und Muskie, "Dinner in Honor of Congressman Jeffery 
Cohalan, " Senate Office B\11.lding, Waebiugton D.C. (levember 14, 1969 ) .  
5iiey Ysrk 'lilies. (August 20, 1968), p. 26, col. 6. 
6ilom.er Bigart, "Mwikie Asserts Halt in Banbing Was Not 
Timed fCYr the !lection, " Ney York fl.Its) (November 21 1968 ) �  p. 21, col. 7.  
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These three occasions only covered a tvo month period ilmaediatel7 
before the election. Analysis suggested this to be an early 
position that he no longer found primary snd abWldoned. He felt 
that the bombing halt was a calculated risk and th�t more calculated 
risks should be taken 1n ot�r areas of decision making. Typical 
of tbis position was his statement to tbb Ccamonwealth Club, 
San Fr&noieco, September 18, 1968. ilWe ere going to have to take 
certa.in calculated risks in the pursuit of peace, just as we have 
long uccepted the necessity of taking calculated risks in vaging 
He advocated the ideas for the return of our prisoners 
of war by a negotiated settlement four times. 
July 5, 1970-New York Times 
September 22, 1970-Congress 
January 23, 197l�California stnte Democratic Convention 
FebruaJ')" 23, 1971-University ot PenneylTania 
The dates of 1970 and 1971 suggested a fairly u.v poeition growing 
out of the recent prisoners or var issue. He repeated the fact 
that the prisoners of war we" ve-ry important in the United states 
deeiaion making process. He continued to say that Hanoi would 
be williD& to negotiate c .e:.cbange Of prisoners if they knew 
the United States governmeat vaa se�ioue about negotiations . By 
serious negotie.iionB Mr. Muaki• aeant setting a detinite timetable 
in order to bring our priBonere of var bale. He also believed that 
it W6'.S vital.}¥ important �hai the UGited States atio.k to any 
timetable they mq set. He continued to aak the queetion, vby 
rl Stephen Roberts, r'Mukie Discerns Wish for Change, "  11.w 
Xork T1me11 (September 19, 1968) ,  p. 39, col. 1 .  
should Hanoi be vil1ing to negotiate it the United States continued 
to bicker concerning a means of wi tbdrawal? Similar to the other 
statements, was the one Senator Muekie delivered before Congl:'ess, 
September 22, 1970 • 
• • • the only way we will aohieve: the goal or a return 
or our prisoners is through a negotiate.d setttlement. And 
we must continue to press for the undertaking of serious 
negotiations of all aspe<':ts of terminating thiu var, with 
the prompt release of ell .American f"i soner:s in Vietll81'1 
of the highest negotiated priority. 
To accaapany his ujor position for &. negotiated settlement, 
Senator Muskie de"leloped three secondar,r poeitione one being that 
Saigon should not have veto powers over the United States. It 
appeared that the possibility of a S::igon veto ves significant 
to Mr. Muskie. He thought that the withdrawal problem should be 
eolved by the United Statee setting a timetabl� and permitting 
Saigon and Hanoi to negotiate accordingly. Senator Muskie believed 
the President was faltering before a Canmunist dictatorship because 
he allowed de.igon to have vsto power over �he United States in 
8Jl1 decision it made. This vaa a position that he mentioned five 
times. 
September 13, 1969-Weat VirFDi& Federat.ion of 
Democratic Women 
October 15, 1969--Bates College 
1'0Yalllber 7 ,  1969-mma:resa 
November l.4, 1969--Di.mler in Honor of Congressman 
J.etf•'f!7 Cobal�.kland, California 
MArch 5 ,  19'70-NatiOIJ.8.l. h-ess Cl'® 
Typical of bis poe.1 tion on this iasue we.a the statement made 
during a maJ w speech deli v.red. at Be.tes College, October 15, 1969. 
8u. s . ,  Congres;ion•J Recot9, (September 22, 1970 ) ,  CXVI, 
Sl6134. 
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"Now is the time also to make clear to the Saigon government that 
we will not permit it to veto our ef'torts to explore new ways to 
end the war. 119 Senator Muskie believed that if the United States 
vould set a detini te wi tbdraval date, Saigon would be willing to 
negotiate accordingl�. 
Senator Muskie ' s  stand against President 'Nixon' s 
Vietnamization policy was that it vould not bring lasting peace, 
because ot the increased use of troops rather than an immediate 
total v.ithdraval. He also belieYed that the Vietnamization policy 
was too slow and dangerous. Tilt re were many soldiers being killed 
while others, tew in number, were being sent home . The young men 
still f 1ghting and dying should all be caning hane. The 
Vietnamization policy VB.8 intolerable to him; therefore , a new 
system vas needed, advocated Muakie .  In the data 13tudied, Mr. 
Muskie stated this position sixteen times. 
October 81 1968--Congreas 
February 17, 1969-lfniYereity ot Miem! 
September 131 1969-West Virginia Federation of 
Deaocratic Women 
October 15, 1969--Bates College 
October 16, 1969--Uniftreity of Tennessee 
Ho-Yember ), 1969-Congreae 
March 5, 1970-Natloaal Press Club 
March 26, 1970-Corigresa 
April 3, 1970-Cengreae 
April 10, 1970-Congress 
May ll, 1970-Congreas 
Mey 28, 1970-Biermial Convent.ion of the 
Jmalgaated Olothins Wort.re 
Jul.7 S ,  1910-lew York Thies 
January 2.3, 1971-Callfornia Democratic State 
Ooir•ention 
January 31, 1971-University of Hartford 
February 23 ,  1971-Universit,' ot Pennsylvania 
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TJp.1.cal ot his poaition vu tbe statement he me.de in a. major 
speeoh to the National J:reas Club, March 5 ,  1970. 
I belieYe that the ·President' s  Vietnemization 
policy can be only a formula tor the perpetuation of 
the var . What the l're&ident ealls hia silent majority 
is silent only because it has not been made to realize 
that altboqh eaae U.S. troops will 1»18aning heme, ve ere not really getting out of Vietnam. 
He reiterated three time8 that mt felt that it was poor poliey 
to commit troops to Laos and Cambodia. 
May 11, 1970--0ougreaa 
January Jl, 1971-tJn.1.versit.7 of Hartford 
Februa?'7 23 ,  1971-Uni•erait;y of Pennql-.ania 
He believed that this action merely strengthened his viewpoint 
that the Nixon Vietn8Dl.ization policy- waa continuing the war 
rather than ending 1 t because of the increased use of troops 
into Cambodia Md Laos. .lt the University of Pennsylvania, 
February 2.3, 1971, be stated, ''I believe it vu wrong to unleaab 
South Vietne.mese troops across tbe border or Laos and support 
thea there, as I believed it wan wrong to lead them aoross the 
border ot Cambodia. nll He reminded bis listener• that if the 
President had a plan for ending the var in Vietnam it vas very 
8lllbiguous and it vasn't  working especially in situations where 
the President was increasing the use of troops rather than 
decreasing them. 
II. In vhit yay yere Muakie's oe;t.ral. ideu supported 1n 2fdo.r 
to SU1titz h11 position oa thl Jittp•p War 111\it? 
In supporting hia ideas on the Vietna War iaaue 
10 U.S. , Qgpgre11innnl Btcord, (Maroh 5 ,  1970 ) ,  CJ.VI, S.3094. 
11u.s. , G®ms1i0Ml legprd, (October 8, 1968), CXIV, SJ0009. 
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Sena.tor Muskie employed the loi;ic&..l use of exampJ � preodcJ!ri n�tf- ly 
with a lesser use of caWJe-eff�ct. Hv mudc limi:Lt:tl mK of ethical 
and enotional proof � .  
I n  support of hi s  strongo ::> t. position, R rlt..gotir,ted 
settlement , he d(:iveJ oped the positions that: {l)  the \Jal!' should 
be aettl0d by a po) i ticaJ settlement rather than by a mi 1.i te.ry 
victory, (2) we must commit our�elves to a definite timetable, 
(3 ) 3ecretary Genera� U Thant should be asked to serve as a 
medie.tor et peace talks, (4) a bombing halt should be attL�mpted 
to improve negotiation�, (5 )  calculated risko 3hould be ta�en, 
(6) the only way we would a.chiev� the goal of e. return of our 
prisoners of war was through a negotiated settlement. Ht) 
frequently mentioned the f&ct that & militer-1 solution was not 
viable for Vietn8I!l, and it could not bring �eacc in other 
countries of that region. Typical of the kind of support �re­
sented was this statPJnent to Congress, Mey :1, 1970 . ''The 
vay to obtain movement tovard a U6gotir..tcd settle!l1t..nt is not 
to redouble our efforts for a military victory as we have 
witnessed in the past. "12 Senator Huskie stated the present 
administration was not proving itaeli' to the ;Un.erican people , 
that the United States was re ally not trying i' or a po li ti Ct 1 
settlement but for a military victory . He reiteruted tb�t the 
United St�tes certainly could not work toward a negoti�ted 
settlement if the escalation of the Vietnam War continued ea 
Nixon felt ws.s necessary with the increase of his use of troops 
in Crunbodia.. 
12 U .S . , Congressional Rocord, (May 11, 1970) ,  CXVI, S6954· 
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Senator Muskie incorporated his use of example in 
support of his withdrawal position versus the .Nixon open-ended 
policy. Mr. Muskie believed that the President ' s  tirootable was 
dependent on lliifioi 1 $  willingness to de-escalate the wfl.T; therefore, 
� ?  
tht JJOlicy could not \lork . - "  fie gave this instance of the use 
of cause-eff<:-Jct in a speech to Congress, .November 7 ,  1969 . 
So long as tha United v�ates commits its foreign 
policy, as well �3 its ground combat troops to the 
successful prosecution of this war by military means, 
the authorities in Saigon P..rc under no i:•ressure to 
make t�e politic&l er �ilitary &ffort tnat i s  
neces�ary if they are to tak� ful  responsibility 
for bringing the conflict to a clo�e . 14 
In essence, this instance stated that as long us the United States 
continued in the same manner, they would have to a�sume the 
rcaponsibili ty for the consequenceB. Sena.tor Muskie believed 
that if we had an announced v.1.tb:irawe.l date then we could nnnounce 
to our own people as well as the Saigon 6Dd Hanoi government s that 
w were tired of the mounting loss to our .:.mericen troops and 
we were ready to negotiate . Most Americans wanted an orderly 
disengagement from Vietnam but how best could that goal be 
accomplished if the United States continued to defer the troop 
v.1.tbdraws.ls as bad been dona in the past? 
Senator Muskie again made use of cause-ef"f ect in the 
major epeech deli�ered to tho Nations.J. Frese Club, March 5 ,  1970. 
13 "Muskie Criticizes Nixon Wnr Folic1 es, " Bev York Ti;es, 
(September 14, 1969) ,  p. 19, col. 1. 
ll+u.s. , Congre1s1oM1 Recgrd. (November 7,  ·1969) ,  CXV, 
s33549. 
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By his preoccupa.tio:n w-1 th Vietnami zing the war, 
the l'reaiiient has turned his b&ck on rvric. By l�ttin� slmo5t 
tour months go by \dthout sending a senior personnel 1 
repreaento.tivtl' to I&ril.i, he has dow-gredod negotio.tion�. 5 
Senator Muskie took a firm stund concerning tho I-resident a.sk1ng 
Secretary General U 'I'hant to act a� mediator in the ..:- 2rie peace 
talks. The previous exBmple shoved what had happened at the 
negotie.t!ng table because the-: 1..dministre.tion failed in its 
reeponsibiJ i ties.  
Senetor Muskie argued that i·rt.oidant Nixon was felling 
into the trap of e Communist dictatorship. Tc support his 
position that 6rigon should not have the veto pcwer over tt0 
United Sts.tes, Senator 1'-lUBkie 'believed that al though the Pr<.0 sident 
referred at one point to fi fixed timetable for withdrawal, which 
he said he could not meke public, .his s·u.bsequent comments rn&.de 
it clear that it was dependent upon 3aigon' s ce.paci ty to teke 
over the war and Hanoi ' s  willingneas to de-escalate the war. 
He used the form of example to furth&r support this position 
that Nixon was cam.plying to Caigon1 s doms.nds rathor th1.1n S;:Jigon 
complying to the United S-lratcs. He stated s.t the West Virginia 
federation of Democratic Women, September 13, 1969 , that fresident 
Nixon was not strong enough to face realities. 
President Nixon fumbled the ball badly in the 
cease-fire es8oc1at.d vith Ho Chi Min.h' s death. It 
aeeas like the President allowed Saigon to have a 
veto over our action and didn ' t  present the opponent 
with a •fgcere view of thiti country' s  desire to end 
the var. 
15u. s. , Congressional &cord ,  {March 5 ,  197C ) ,  CXVI, S.3095 .  
l6nMuskie Criticizes Nixon War Policies,·" p. 19, col. 1. 
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Because of his attitude age.inst President Nixon' s  Viet.Damization 
po� icy Senator Muskie gave this example to the Amalgamated Clothing 
Workers of America, Atlantic City, Mq· 28, 1970, of bow the present 
policy was not working • 
• • •  the President' s  po�icies are spawning d<aestic 
unrest a.rid intc>rnntj onel r�ril for the /.reerica."'1 peopl e .  
The war in Southeast Asi a  and the arms race constitute� 
th£ grevast threat to our invclvemsnt on� c?..n imegine. 7 
Senator Husk� e further identif1€d his poei ti on on the iesue of 
the intol�rabJ e V:ietnrunization policy by giving an exa'llx:;le of its 
raJ.l ac1 ous rei1soning in en article printed in the NFW York Times, 
July 5 '  1970. 
The President ' s indeterminat� schedule, which vould 
keep a large U . S. force in Vietnam indefinitely, might 
for�e Hanoi to move &gainst the rcmai�eng �.me.ri�ans, 
triggering a new round of escalation.L 
Other fallacie s that were present in the administration poJ icy was 
that Vietnamization was causing unnecessary .frustrations among 
the young people 'Who questioned our national morality, and loss 
of faith in the c&pacity of our 3ystem to meet the national needs 
of � Americans. To further substantiate bis P,Osition that the 
Vietnemi.zation policy vas not vorking he stated in an article 
reported by the New York AW§, July S, 1970 . "We have only to 
look at what has happenad in Indochina and at what is happening 
in om- country to see the folly of the pre sent policy. 1119 
l? "Muskie Seys Nixon is Dividing Nation, '1 New York Times, 
(May 29, 1970) ,  f• lC, col. 2. 
18u. s . ,  QonrrvSsi9p•l Record '  (Jul.7 7 ,  1970 ) ,  CXVI, �3162. 
19�. 
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Mr .  Muskie repeated bits belief that the vq out of the 
vu does not lead tbro�h Cembodia. The vrq to reduce thn level 
or hostilities and the rate or Am�rican casualties vas not to 
send our men on ne..., search and destroy missions ae the present 
Adainiet.ration vould have us believe . Because of these occursneea, 
Mr. Muskie reasoned that the Nixon Vietnamization policy vas not 
vorkisaa to reduce the troops Wt inoreaee them inst.•ed. He 
etated that he believ•d �be action deepe•ecl our inYOlTelllent, 
videned the var ,  and left 'Q8 even further from the peace the U . S. 
vented em needed. The ex•ple that be repeated on taree 
ditferent occasions vas the atateaent in a speeeh at the Univereity 
of Pennsylvania, Pebruary 23, 1971. 
The longer w lend our presence to this expanding 
contliot, tbe lonaer tllia conflict vill emure. And 
the longer it endures , the JIOre profound will be the 
iDJlJZ7 done, not onq to \he people• of Vietaaa and 
Caabodia and Laos, but to our own ccnmtrT, to our 
aen vbo are killed or •ai•ed aD4 to their taailie1, 
to our 1ust1tutiona ot learniq, to or proced\ll'es 
for &OYerning, to our coatidence i�ur aocie't7• • 
ability to reach for ita own ideas. 
As well as the much used logice.1 proof, Senator Muskie also used 
ethical and emotional proof• in a limited vey. In order to build 
his O\ln etbiaal proof in hie speech at the Univera1� or Tennessee, 
October 16, 1969, Senator Muskie supported his position to speak 
OD an.y issue dealing with the Vietnaa War and substantiate hie 
authority. 
I have eng.,.O 1• a s.arch tor a way to eDd 
the fighting and killing as a United States Senator 
vbo aade tvo tripe tc that part of the vorld-one as 
20u.s,, Q•mssigee2 i�JCQJ"d, (March 1, 197-0 ) ,  CXVII, 52162 . 
u part of the Man::field Mi 3: dor. &"'ld one a.s a i:e.rt 
of the 196? elE:ction observers group. Further I 
have read e:.;:tensi v�ly �'ld conf.u1 ted '111. th !en -who 
know the problemo of Vietnam intimately. 2 
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To establi sh his devotion to the cause of finding a wey tQ end 
the fighting and killing in Vietnam, 3ewitar Muskie continued 
in Lis Sf:aec.b at tr�.:. Univ.:;rsit�· of 1enne::;scc. 
l;JG ara engag3d in the search for a 'Way to end 
the fighting and the killing, to give the Vietnamese 
peoplo tho opportunit1· to vork out their own polltical 
dastiny, and to lay grour.d work for a m��e appropriat� 
United. States poli�y in Southeast Asia. 
Mr . 1¥'.:us:d.:1.;:; �eci. er.totion� proof to sus.-port his poai ti on on r>ance 
"When !.e pe.inted the picture of pity and sympathy for the 
Vi•:>tnamese people in a speech before the United Jewish Appeal, 
Febl·uary h. , 19?1.. 
I Gaw pictures the..t their children bav� draw and 
hung en the walls of these vcr, ea.me shelt€rs, pictures 
with no explosives in them, no e.i.rplanes or tanks, 
no �€Ople with guns, � sight vhich they are accu.:3tomed 
tc at pre�ont. They e.re picture� of peace, of land 
e.nd er the things they grew on the lll.Ild, cf birdo in 
the sky, e.nd of people at "Work. er at :r;-est. I am 
convinced thst we �us� do �ll �c cen to help meke 
these pict\D:'es c<mie true. 2 
III. £..Jav� m�jor oolicv changes eff�cted reyisions or mo<lifice;tions 
if §.PY• of b;in 'R2eitio?l§.? 
�itbin th� period of time considered in this study it 
vas discovered th�t out of the marv policy chznges that have 
occured there vere four which wre considered significe.nt. 
21F.dmund Muskie, 11Moratori 'IJll Ylua One-A Me8D.ing, n Senate 
Office Building, Washington D. C .  \October 16, 1969). 
22.nwl· 
23F.dmund Muskie, "Muki• aqa Americans can learn fran Israel ' s  
Cause , "  Senate Office Building, Washington D. C. (February 10, 1971) . 
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(1) President J obnson' s sacala.tion of the war, (.2) the ilr1pa.�t @f 
poliq of wi 't.bdrawaJ. o.fi'ered anothi::r ch�e . 'l'her�; hi:.s been much 
debate u to an opea-�radeci withdrawal tilrletable. (4) The r<!c�nt 
debate OTer the pria�r• of war isaw. wa:; another . .factor effecting 
Ill clee.lia, with Jobu®' i escala.tiOL. �olicy, Senator Mualde 
baa expnsaed acme opinion. litit hb.s aince 1968 t;upported a negotiated 
settlement vitb no more ascalatio.n. 
iiis poai.tiOA egaoerning tbe bombill& halt was that a 
praature halt ill tb8 b<abi».g of . North Vietno:m c91L d hurt rather 
thaa help ia the •&oi.iat.ions, unless Hanoi was willing to negotiate 
a aettleae11"t. 24 JJ't.ar the bombing halt vae o.nnounced ¥.r. Muskie 
believed that it wao the ti.rat step to�ard negotiations and the 
balt vas a oacessity. Even tho\lih it was dona in private, S�tor 
Muski" wae so concerned a.bout tJw !'ightin& end kiJling in Vietnam 
in 196? that he wrote a letter to the Pre sident in January, 1968, 
requesting a halt to thai baal.xing in order to influence the peace 
talks. 
Concerning the issue of' a way to end the war, Senator Muskie 
pointed out ia Soptember, 1968, "Negotiat\? wi tb. Hnnoi &n immediate 
end of limitation of hostili tes and the wi thdra:wal from South Vietnam 
of all foreign forces . :i25 This position referG back to his belief 
that if we announced a wi thdraval timetable then Hanoi 'AO'Uld be 
'Jilling to negotiate. 
24.xnowles, p. 42, col. 1. 
25:iSide by .3idel!, Senior .)cho:. t1.stic, XCIII, (September 27 , 
1968), 13. 
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Since 1968, Senator Muskie has stated that the Geneva 
Accords would be an acceptable basis for negotiatio�; a cease-fire, 
and withdrawal or military forces .  But he also felt that propostls 
for immediate withdrawal had several problems . Due to the continued 
escalation of the war, no visible actioWJ of troop reduction with 
the Administration• s Vietnsmization policy he believed an announced 
witb:iraw&l was more and more imperativeJ therefore , his position for 
a fixed withdrawal date evolved. 
Relating to the release of prisoners of war, Senator 
Muskie was concerned enough to amend bis article to the New York Times, 
July 5 ,  197C. "We should stick to the eighteen month timetable 
that I proposed subject on:y to Hanoi ' s  willingness to release 
all American prisoners of war. 1126 
To reiterate hie strong position for negotiations he 
me.de this �tatement in an address to Congress, September 22, 1970 . 
The o� way we will achieve the goal of a return 
of all prisoners is through a negotiated settlement 
which calls !or withdrawal of troops. It i s  true 
that all prisoners are not released until the fighting 
ha.s ceased, but every atep
2
1ovard negotiations ie 
another step toward peRce. 
Senate-� Muskie repeat-;1d frequently that the only way we were 
going to be able to reach any e.greementa on the issues which 
concern us most was to make clear our willingness to negotiate 
all issues of the 'l.lar. He believed we could negotiate the release 
of our Jimerican prisoners of ve.r, a sef e vi thdrawal of all our 
26 U . S . , Cop.gressioDJ.1 R�copi, (July ? ,  1970 ) ,  CXVI , Sl9679. 
s16134. 
27u. s. , Copgr9saionaJ. Record, (September 22, 19?0 ) ,  C'AVI ,  
troops now stationed in Vietnr.:.m, in addition there could be 
a cease-fire between our troops and theirs which could work 
toward agreemeri; s to end the fighting in CLmbodia and U..os. 
And the U. S .  could encourage the Vietni;J':lesc parties to ucgotiste 
a political settlement that would restore a mee.suro of pRA.CC to 
all of Vietnam. 
CHAPTER V 
SlHWtI JllD COliCLUSIOBS 
It vu the purpoae ot this .tud7 to looate, deacribe, 
and anal7u the central ideea on tbe Vietnaa Wcr is•• torvarded 
"1' Senator. l'.dauad M\udde u show by a critical �•1• of the 
Seaa�' a polltioal prca.nnctlMllts on the Vieta.a War 1Hue 
r:r.:, 19-68 to ll1ci 1971. Tbe acocapl.1•-..rt ot Ws purpoee 
in.YGlftd obtaining apeeclae1 , etataenta, ud pre•a Hl•aMa by 
Senator Mukie trca tile .-..r ot 1968 to •:Prta£ Of 1971. The 
l•v xm u.a, Qmsreutea•, nua, aat nttl Spne"• s< tu 
MallJ rbatal"ical aodel• were previewd bt.tt eiaoe the 
preMDt atl117 •• i••ue-oriented the tollaviq criteria W&tri 
j\ldpd u bet'ter eui te4 tor the p\ll'pO• ot analJ'a.1111 aD:.< lasm 
th:roop e.a •xkmled. period fit U..  Ti. aiteria eeleated 
v.re three in n...-.. 
1. Wba� wre ·ta. eentral i4•u preaeded b,r Mukie oonoerrdng 
h11 po11ition on the Vietnaa War iee\18? 
2 .  In vb&t V8'3 ven Mualde'• central ideas supported in cxrder 
t.o j...ut)' Id.a poaitl• on tho 'fiet.ua War ieaae? 
). Ban •.1• poliq ehaape •fteoted rnia!ou or aodit1cationti 
it 8f11 of hie poeitiona? 
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Tb" materie.le vero ecm.pi1 ed and �rranged chronoJ ogiealJy .  Then 
eaoh criterion ve.e applied to the combin�d materials in order 
to analyze the thrust and scope of Senator Muskie ' s  poaition. 
Sinae 1968, !dnn.md Muskie has believed that the ' only vay 
to end the var val!! through DeiOtictiona. He oolieved that 
the 0.neYa Accords pro'ri.ded tor negotiations. These negotiations 
he believed to be the anever for peace. Hovever, in May, 1970, 
he Mnt:ioned th�t ther� vas no single answer to ending the ve.r. 
�kie �tated thet the war should end 1n e political settlement 
not I? military one ;  tbffrefore , he did not t1Upport Nixon' s 
Vietnatlizaticm pol icy. �nator Muskie thought that w should 
commit oureelvee to disengagement , implement that oamnitment 
by e pha.,ed plan of vithdraval gee.rad to an e.nnouncPd ti:Rieteble . 
!n !)le.nning t�t vi thdraval the United States should pranote 
prospects tor a negotiated politice.1 settlement. In October, 
1969, Sen1ttor Muskie eaid be had eerious �stions about 1mmed1ate 
v.1tbdrev1t.1 . lo'YeabeP, 1969 , he ed...octtt�-d announcing a vitbdrewal 
date � in Hny, 1970 , be ottered his De-claretion for Peace tor 
Ind.ochi.nn wM!'fJ hf) gaw. sJ\ ei ght�ga menth vithdrm.ie.l dstl'.' 
(D�oemb-·r,  1971 ) �ubject only to Hanoi' s  villingness to ralcase 
tbe J.tteries.n prl�oners of WU and to promise the aaf'ety Of the 
viibdraving American troops. �eauae ot th� V1etn8lllizat1on 
p«>licy Sene.tor Muskie e}>..anged hi s  witbdrs.wal policy in NovE-rtber, 
196<? , and bae meinte.ined that poei ti on. HP advocatc-4 that 
Seerotary General U Thant ehould be asked to be the mediator 
at the t-aris peace talks. Before the bombing halt was announced 
Senator Muskie ca::aent�d that a preme.ture halt could hurt rather 
than help unless Hanoi wanted to enter serious negotiations. 
H'ter the ennouncement of the bombing hs.lt Senator Muskie believed 
tMt the ha.1 t we.a j UBtified and ve.s the first step toward bringing 
the var to an end. This position shoved apparent inconsistency 
in Sens.tor Muskie ' s  private and public position. Even though 
he supported negotiations he felt that &<Ile calculated riBks 
should be tekan in every decj,eion J!IH.king prooet's ooneerning the 
Vietnaaa Wnr. However, be m&intained that position tor only two 
months in 1968 prior to the elections tb&n dropped the position. 
In continuation or his po:ll.tion that e. negotiated settlGm.&nt 
vas the only vay to and the var, Sana.tor Muek16 said that Hanoi 
vould be willing to return our prisoners ot war only thrcugh 
negotintions. However, he rurttun- oontendEld that the definite 
vitbdrave.l timetable ehould be kept onl7 i:t Hanoi ve.s willing 
to negotif\te. 
t>enator Muskie revealed the.t tha Viotnf.Ullir&ation pol icy 
pel"llitted Saigon to hftve voto povere over the vithdraval method. 
Be t>.lie•ed that this vas poor policy and that Vashiagton ebould 
make the decision on bow and vhen to vi thdrav. 
M-1-. Muskie f'elt that the policy of Vietnaa1aation va.e 
only a tormula tor perpt;tU».tion of the war. He �Bo held the 
belief 'that the present policy showed no prospeots for lasting 
peace 1n Vietnam. 
/'.fter Nixon' s  increase of the use o.t roreea into 
Ceabodi& Muskie belieYed that it was a mietalce to go into Uaatbodis, 
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and to escaJ.ate the var and that the administration was defeating 
its purpose of en:y type of vi thdrawal policy. He repeated the 
essence of his proposal that a fixed 'Withdrawal date would bring 
release of our prisoners, a safe 'Withdrawal of our troops, 
a cease-fire and an opportunity to work toward agreements to end 
the fighting in Cambodia and Laos, and an opporttlllity to encourage 
Vi�tnam partie s  to negotiate a settlement . 
Senator Muskie used the logical form of example to support 
his position that a negotiated settlement was needed and it was only 
by a negotiated settlement that the war would came to an end. He 
also used six subpoints to support his negotiated settlement 
position. Senator Muskie believed that President Nixon wanted a 
military victory and not a political settlement. Sena.tor Muskie 
contended that a political settlement was the only way to end 
the war and that a military victory was not possible. He again 
supported this contention with the use of example. In support 
of Senator Muskie ' s  withdrawal policy he used the forms of 
support of example and cause-effect. Senator Muskie believed 
that President Nixon was down-grading the Paris peace talks 
because he h8d not provided a. qualified person to act as mediator. 
Senator Muskie contended that Secretary General U Thant should 
be asked to hold this position. 3enator Muskie supported this 
position 'With the use of example . Senator Muskie believed that 
the bombing halt in November, 1968, was a necessity and that it 
was the .first step in ending the war but before the bombing halt 
vas announced he contended that if the action was premature it 
could hurt rather than help negotiations. Senator Muskie had 
An apparent inconaistency in his public position and his private 
position, because in January, 1968, he privately wrote to President 
Johnson asking him to halt the bombing. He stated that sane 
calculated risks had to be taken concerning the bombing halt 
as vell as other decisions concerning the Vietnam Wer. He held 
e. position on the bombing halt and one on calcuJ.ated risks , 
however, the two positions were not well supported. 
Senator Muskie supported hi.s position that Saigon should 
not have veto powers 0ver the United States in deciding a 
withdrawal policy, qy- the uee of example. Sena.tor Muakie ' e  
position on the Vietnamization policy of President Nixon was 
that Vietnemization would not bring the var to en end, it 
provided for no lasting peaoe and it wae only perpetuating the 
\18.r .  He supported that position with several uses of example 
demonetreting where the present policy was not working. Senator 
MUBkie believed that President Nixon was not consistent with his 
own policy beoauee he increasad the use of forces in Cs.;lbodia 
and Leos. Senator Muskie supported his pOsition that it was 
poor policy to canmit troops by use of ex8mple. 
In providing ethical appeal Senator MUakie established 
e.nd supported bis e.uthority to speak on any issue of the Vietnsm 
wae as of October, 1969. He also used a form of emotional appeal 
to draw a picture for his li:steners of the kind of life the 
South Vietnamese live under conditions brought on by the war. 
In the analysia O"l Seru;.tor Muskie ' s  central ide-as 
research lead to the conclusion that the logical f onn of example 
was daninately used for support. 
Concerning each of the four major policy changea which 
were (1) }resident Johnson 1 s escalation policy, (2) November 
bombing halt, (3) J:-resident Nixon ' s Vietnamization polic7--open­
ended versus fixed withdrawal policy, (4) prisoners of war issue 
as a factor in deciding the type of wi tbdraval system to use, 
research revealed that Senator Mu::ikie hed never ::;upported any 
escalation but rather supported a negotiated settlement. He 
advocated a premature bombing halt may hurt rather than help 
the negotiations but after the bombing halt was anncuih;t":d 
Senator Muskie said that the action was a necessity and was 
the first step in ending th e  war; thi s action modified his 
position. Then t"resident Nixon came into office and initiated 
his Vietna.mization policy vhich Senator Muskie believed vould 
not bring lasting peace and was only a perpetuation of the war. 
�resident Nixon' s  Vietnamization policy did not modify Senator 
Muskie ' s  �sition but it strengthened it in that his position 
on withdrawal was strong and his position was finn in setting 
a definite timetable of December, 1971. However , in October, 
1969, Senator Muskie said he had serious questi, ns about an 
immediate withdraval ,, but in Ifovember, 1969, because of the 
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lack of success of the Vietnamization policy Mr . Muskie advocated 
a fixed 'Withdrawal timetable. The most recent prisoners of 
var issue was of great concern to Senator Muskie; however, he 
still contended that a fixed withdrawal would be more successful 
for the United States prisoners of var than would the present 
policy, but a definite withdrawal timetable should be kept only 
if Hanoi would be willing to negotiate. Senator Mu.skie believed 
that if the United St£.tes wou_1d announce fl tim0tai::1� and etick 
to it; Hanoi vouJ d be willlng to negotiate for thG s�fe return 
cf United States prisoners of var as well as the rarogining troops 
ther\, now. 
Conclydons 
The da.ta coD.ected end f:>.naJ.yzed in this :::tudy suggentt>d 
the fo1lo'loling conclusions: 
ma,jor is8ues from 1968 to mid 1<)71. 'l'ti.e four ma.jor policy 
cho.nge:s dco.J.t with in the study did not sig11if:l cant.l.� modify 
bia position ��th the exception cf the November bombing halt . 
In October, 1969 , Mr .  Huski� said he had s�rlous que:.;tions 
about withdrawing our forces but because of the unsucco�sful 
V:i.etnemi zation policy he advocated in November, 1969 , that 
a fixed withdrawal timetable was neceseary. R� had con­
sistently argued for a negotiated settlement which incorporates 
many· other supporting pcsi tionB held by tfoskie . He also 
continuod to support the a.esumption that esealntion of the 
\IRr 'Wfi.S and wou1d be a tragic mJstake. ViE.itnamiza.tion rolicy 
\la.s too a l  ow un<l de.ng(;roue t o  be successful . Setting a 
'\d tbdri;;wal de.tf'I wa� a strong step towa.rd peace. Our 
prisoners of we.r were en important ff,ctor in the type: of 
""1.thdrawal ve chose. 
2 .  Senator Muskie ' s  misgivings concernlng the VietnBlll °W2..r 
became mor� intense since 1968. He admitted in 1966 that he 
was not well versed in the issue cf the Vietnam Wsr therefore , 
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be had a tendency to accept other leader ' s  positions. Due 
to the fact thut he has been one of the prominent contenders 
for the 1972 Presidential election, Muskie felt it was 
necessary to l�a.rn about the Vi�tnam War issues. He accepted 
the position of a negotiated settlement in 1968 and has 
maintained that position. He a.1eo ms.de a statement in 
November, 1968 , concerning hi s  withdrawal policy but it 
wa.s not until March, 1970, that he developed .§tron& iHsues 
on the war. 
3. It could be observed that the majority of Sem.i.tor Mm>kie' s 
policy revisions were reactionary in nature. That is, as 
e. politica.":"! leader of national prominence he did not generally 
initiate an ier.ue but rather took his �·:.::.1 itical position 
following the injection of that issue into the national 
political arena. The lone exception to this appears to 
be found in his appeal for Secretary General U Thant to 
act as e. media.tor betveen waring pertie;s e.t the Paris r.ieaoe 
talk . 
4. The means of support that Senator Muskie used most in 
devel oping his idee.s vere: his l ogical use of example to 
provide support for hi o position. By the l ogicaJ use of 
exronple and cause-effect he sufficiently supported his 
position;. for a negotiated settlem£'nt as wel l  as the 
aubpoints ,  Saigon should not have veto powers over ths 
United States ,  Vietnami zation policy is intol erable, and 
1 t wao poor policy to commit troops to Cambodia and Le.oG. 
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He failed to adequa.tely support the two subpoints that 
called for a bombing ha.1 t Hnd that calculated ri�!ks should 
be takan. His use of ethica:>. and emotional prooft.> were 
minor in nature . 
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APPENDIX A 
Senator li.:<lmund Y.iuskie 
�enate Office BuiJding 
'.J.:ishing'lion D.C. 
Dear S ir: 
February 5, 1971 
Spe0ch Departnent 
Eastern Illinois Univers 
Charleston, Illinois 615 
I am a Gradu�te Student in Speech at Eastern �llinois University. I 
a� very much interested in doifle my graduate thesis about you. 
Would it be possible for ·you to send me a copy of the speeches that you 
delivered between :\ugust 1968 - present date? Along with these speeches 
please n�te the exact d.1.te of the spe,,.ch, the loc�.tion of the speS' ch, and 
the type of audicn<!e .  This informn.tion is vital to my study. 
If t.her� is :rny bio11,raphica] inforn'ltion :.ihout yourself that you 
think would be helpful to me to complete my speaker ' s  stuny of you please 
enclose th�t also. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
Sinc�re1y, 
Che�rl Keyser 
EDMUND S. MUSKIE 
M A I N E  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 
�!iss Cheryl !:c�ys8r 
Spece!\ Pcpartnent 
!':lstC'n\ Il J inois llni versj ty 
C:har1 c -; ton , T J. ] j  noi.s <'10�0 
D , ,. v ,ear !. l ss "cyscr: 
Th:m1 �'ot1 for your n:c:<'n1 l < • t tcr. 
T am J ooking lnto th'.! <tt1csti.011s yo11 hi1vc r<dsccl J.n 
vour 1 rttpr :rncl T \·!iJ 1 hTj tc to you aeain as soon :ts I CUTl 
ah} c� to pnw i clc yo11 w.i th a mc�m i nr,ful response. 
Sincerely, 
l ln i tctl S<'nator 
Mr. Bob Sheppard 
Press Secretary 
Senate Office B:1iJc1in� 
Washin�on L .C .  
DP.ar Mr . �heppard: 
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February 11, 1971 
Speech Department 
EAstern Illinois Univ�rsity 
Charleston, Illinois 619?.0 
I am a Graduate Student in Speech at Eastern Illinois University. I 
am very nruch interested in doing my Graduate Thesis about Senator Muslde. 
For ltzy' study it will be necessary to have sone biographical inforWttion 
as well as speeches for analysis. Since I have limited my study t o  Senator 
Muslde ' s  Anti-Wa r spe�ches would it be possible for you to send rrr;f copies 
of any of his Anti-War speeches delivered from September 1968 until present? 
�long with these speeches it is very essential that I know the Location, 
Date, and Occasion of the speeches . ' 
·,fould it also be possible for you to send rrrJ any biographical information 
that is available about Senator Muskie? 
Tharik you for your cooperation. 
S j ncerely, 
Cheryl Keyser 
EDMUND S. MUSKIE JOHN MCEVOY 
ADMINISTRATIVC A981STANT MAINE 
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20510 
Miss Cheryl Keyser 
:�peccll Dcpurtmcnt 
&.t:;tcrn IJ J lnul:; Unlv1!1:::lty 
Charleston, Illinois 61920 
Dear CheryJ :  
February 18, 1971 
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JOHN WHITELAW 
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT 
ROBERT SHEPHERD 
PRESS SECRETARY 
Thank you for your letter requesting information about 
the Senator ' s  anti -war speeches for your graduate thesi s .  En-
closed are a number of speeches and statements as well as bio-
c;raphical information, which should be helpful . We wish you 
succcs� on your pro,ject . 
With best wishes, 
Robert C .  Shepherd 
Mr. Dob Shenpard 
Press Secretary 
Senate Office Building 
Washington D . C .  
Dear ¥.r. Sheppard: 
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¥.arch 15, 1971 
Speech Departroont 
Eastern Illinois University 
Charleston, Illinois 61920 
Thank you for sending me some of Senator Muskie ' s  speeches, and remarks 
at Press Conferences . However, the biography of the Senator was not included. 
Would it be possible for you to send � a biography, a copy of Senator 
Muskie ' s  spe�ch <lelivered in Philadelphia, February 23, on the War and Peace 
issue and every other speech or any remarks given by Senator Muskie on the 
issue durin6 the 1968 Presidential Campaign through the present date. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
S incerely, 
Cheryl Keyser 
EDMUND 6. MUSKIE 
Miss Cheryl Keyser 
Speech Department 
Eastern Illinois University 
Char leston, Illinois 61920 
Dear Miss Keyser : 
WASHINGTON, O.C. 20510 
Apr i l  1 7 ,  1971 
Thank yuu Vt!ry 111uc h  for your rc�Cl!l1L l clter Lu Boh Shephcr<l. Lle 
has l c l l  us Lo work for Lhc Governor o f  Maine, an<l I am f i lling in. 
I am enclosing the b iography of Senator Muskie which you requested 
and I ' m  sorry for the earlier oversight. We have t emporarily run out 
of copies of the Senator ' s  February 23 speech but should get them in 
a few days and I ' l l certa inly send you one as well as other speeches 
on the war for which I can locate copies. 
You ' l l be hearing from me. With warmest best wishes, I am 
Sincerely, 
Kay 
Senate Press Aide 
EDMUND S. MUSKIE 
MAINE 
Miss Chery l Keyser 
Speech Department 
Eaatern Illinois Univer sity 
Char leston, Illinois 61920 
Dear Miss Keyser : 
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WASHINGTON, O.C. 20!110 
April 26,  1971 
I have pulled together some of the Vietnam speeches you requested 
but unfortunately we do not have copies of some of the older ones for 
distr ibut iono 
I have enclosed a fairly good sample of the speeche s ,  though , 
includ ing Senator Muskie ' s  speech at Bates College on �at��il!Ill�Da� 
196� ,  reprinted in the form o f  his Letter t o  Maineo You will also 
find the Senator ' s  March S, 1970, speech before the Natioual P;� s  
Club in which he more or less reopened the Vietnam debate which had 
been dormant during the early �onths of Pres ident Nixon ' s  administration. 
I have also enclosed the Senator ' s  Declaration of Peace resolution from 
May 1970 and a copy of an article which appeared in the New York Times 
in July, "Out of Indochina in 18 Months o 11 While the latter is not a 
speech, it helps spell out the Senator ' s  Vietnam positiono 
Finally, there is a speech g iven at the Un ·i.versity of :Pennsylvania 
in February on Vietnruno 
Our only copies of the other earlier speeches are here in Washington 
and should you be in town at all, naturally you are welcome to come by 
to look at themo Please give me a call f ir s t ,  thougho Our number is 
(202) 225-5344. 
With all good wishes for the success of your project, I am 
Sincerely, 
Kay Mills 
Senate Press Aide 
APPENDIX B 
BATEt, COLLEGE 
Lmdst�n, Maine 
October 15, 1969 
I came to Bates becaur.e I believe today ' s  Moratorim 
can be a time tor learning. TcdE11"' s protest 1e a si.gn of 
eonoern and trustration. It ie a sign ot broken communications. 
I sq that on the issues of Vietnam we ba'Ye much to learn tram 
each other, 8Dd we can only learn if ve are v1111ng to linen 
to each other and to reaaon \Ii th each ot.her. This applies to 
the President and to those \tho protest. Only in this vq 
can we develop policiea on Vietnam wbieb can aeet mr national 
1.ntereeta and end the ug17 divisione ca.uecl b;r our iATI>lTement 
there. 
The right to have a voice in the denlo�nt of public 
policy carries vith it a responsibility tar the reaulte ot 
that policy. A sense of responsibility tor what. we say and 
do should induce sane caution, but it should not impose silence. 
One Of the most dangerous assumptions in a democratic socliety 
is to oonc1"'1e that only the Preeident, the Cabinet and hie 
geuerrils are canpetent to lilake j uigmell'ta on the national interest. 
As the President mq be wrong, hovever, so 11� we be vrong. 
Our involTement in Vietnam did not hapJ>$n overnight 
or through the decision Of one man. It vas the product of 
post World War II policies directed against Ccumuniet expanaions 
e.nd t.hreats of expansion in Europe, .Aaia. dd eleevbere... It was 
stimulated by our fear that Cafaunist support for "wars or 
11berationtt wouJd topple the a�ing countries of Southeast 
Asia e.Dd disrupt the balance ot power in that part of the world . 
It was encouraged by the concern expresa� by governments in 
that area which tel t threatened b;y Communish China end North 
Vietnam. 
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We were persuaded that an aggressive Communism threat<:ned 
to esploit the emerging d.riv• toward nationalism and self­
determination which characterised that erea. In the uncertain 
condi tiOOB following the wi tbdraval of GE-eat Britain aDd France 
frau Southeast Asia, American power seemed to hold a promise 
of security and support for those who 11 ved in that area. 
Although we followed a polia7 Of "limited" involvement in 
VietlWI, we round our participation growing fr<lll teobnical 
asaistance ,  money and weaponea to massive armed intervention. 
We sought to buy time !or the Sout.h Vietnaaese against the 
ecabined onslaught of the Vietooiac e:od the North Vietnamese, 
but in the process w made the struggle an American wer aod 
imposed terrible burdens on ourselves at rune and abroad. 
Bi8tory will render the final verdict on the visdan 
of our decision to enter the V1atJl811 conflict. Our task is 
more immediate--to set new policies where old plans no longer 
apply, and to bring peace where there is none today. 
I have reached sane conclusions on what may be the 
best alternative strategiea and policies, conscious of 
Clark Clifford' s  observation that "to reach a conclusion 8lld 
to implement it ere not the same, especially when one does not 
have th:.• u1 timate power of decision. 11 I offer 11'� conclusions, 
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not as one 'lolho he.a an absolute conviction of his ovn infallibility, 
but as one who seeks to contribute to a constructive policy for 
ourselves and for the people of Southeast Asia. 
FIRST, I believe our primary objective�for the Vietnamese 
as well as for AlJlerican eoldi(:.r::.r--should be to end the fighting 
and killing in Vietnam. 
SECOND, I believe we sbould do what wa can to advance the 
proBpects for a . political settlement in Vietnam. We should not 
design or impose that settlement, but we should do what we can 
to make it poesible. 
THIRD, I believe ve should re-examine the n�turc of 
our interests in Southeast Asia and the kinds of efforts we can 
prudently make to help Asian nations achieve the economic, 
social and politioal etability they want and need . 
It is clearly the deepening conviction of the .American 
people that ve must end our present involvement in Vietnsm . That 
conviction must control our policy. That fnot is reflected in 
a number of propose.ls and policies for disengagement, de­
Americaniza.tion of the war, withdrava.1 or American forces in 
accordance with a variety of tormulas and timetables, de­
escalation of caubat activities, aDd cease-fires. Implicit in 
most of these propoaals are the twin objectives: .An end to 
American involvement, acccmplished in a ll83' which will enable 
the South Vietnamese to carry on without us--as soon as possible-­
in the event n negotiated settlement bas not been achievod in 
the meantime. 
The various formulas for i..rithdravsls raise a number of 
questions: (1)  Shou1 d we commit om-selves to a totr..l withdrawal. 
by a specified date? (2) If no, should our timetable b() publicly 
announced? (3 ) Should ve commit ourselvns , lmblicly at lea.st, 
only as to 'Withdrawal of ground conbat forces--leaving in doubt 
the date and conditions f cr 1...ri thdrmdng air aid J.ogistica.l sup:;,>ort '? 
Involved in the answers to such questions are the viability 
of a continued South Vi�tnemes� effort upon our departure, �nd 
:c:mintena.nce of pressure upon Htmol v.nd the Nt:.tional Liberation 
Front to negotiate. 
In the light of our involvement and its impact upon the 
Vietnameoe people--wh0ther or not hi.:;tory judges it to haw: been 
wise--do we have a responsibility to be concerned about such 
questions c.."ld the imp�ct that the manner or ovr dep5rture will 
have upon the situation ve leave b6bind? 
It is difficult to conceive of basically new proposalR 
to add to those already advanced in a variety of forms. As I 
have consider�d all of the se, and the que stions they raise, I 
hav3 reached cGrtein conclusions . 
1 .  J believe we must dieoneage our forces--in f!P 
orderly way�as soon as possible . I believe such a policy is 
indicated by several considerations : Our efforts have bought 
thr, .South Vietnsmt-)Se people valuable time to develop politiceJ. 
and military viability. Whether er not they have developed the 
'Will and the capecity to shape their own future must be tested 
at some point . Th0re is no way for us to guernntee the existence 
of thF-.t viability. In the last anaJ.ysis ,  the Vietnamese people 
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must create their own �oliticel leedertthif. The imperatives of 
our problems here at home dictate that ve now leave their future 
in their hand� and turn our attention to our own . 
2. l �lieve th�'t wit�\f�. of oyr military forces should 
be orderly and phased in such a way as to ei ve the South Vietn� 
people an opportunity to t>..rljust to it. We should meke it c1ear to 
the government in Saigon that our 'Withdrawal is geared to <.>. 
specific time fre.me to which they roust adjust. Tho other side 
should be left in doubt--e.nd ve should reserve fJ e��ibili ty--a.s 
to the phasing out of logistical and air support. This point , 
it seems to me, could be relevant to their motivation to negotiate . 
Even ae we plan our vithdrawal , it should be our objective 
to pave the we:y for a political settlement between the South 
Vietneli governmont, the National Liberation Front , and other 
groups reprosanting the several social and political tendencies 
in VietnaJU. The kind of vithdrawal proposal advanced by former 
Secretary of Defense C� e.rk Clifford�of those vhich have been 
proposed--illustrstes one way to serve thi� objective . It is 
based on the asslDption that we should continue to seek a 
negotiated settlement in Pari s as we plan for disengagement • 
.Accordingly, Secretary Clifford has proposed e. tvo-sta.ge plan 
which wuld aove o-ur ground canbat troops out by the end of 1970 , 
and which would provide a1r end logistical support for somewhat 
longer. Such a plan, vhile cutting American casuo.l ties, could 
provide an incentive for the South Vietnamese government , the 
NGrth Vietnamese, and the National I,iberation Front to reach 
a negot1at6d settlement, hopefully even before our withdrawal 
is canplete. 
J .  I belieye that a stf,,ndstill cease-fire .might open 
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tbe va:y for a negotiated settlement and a quick end to the fighting 
!00 killing. This suggestion has been resisted by both sides which 
suggests to me its viability. Such an offer could be accompanied 
by a reduction in our off8nsive operations. I! the standstill 
cease-fire plan succeeded , the withdrawal of United States forces 
could be accelerated as international peace-keeping forces stepped 
in to insure obseI"lance of the cease-tire. Ir the standstill 
cease-fire otter did not lead to an early end to the fighting, 
a steady and methodical withdrawal plan would offer an effective 
vey of reducing United States involvement and combe.t losses, while 
creating the conditions which favor a political settlement. 
A standstill cease-fire and & staged withdrawal plan 
do not rise or fal.1 on the succ�ss of the other , but they could 
reinforce each other. Each recognizes that our commitment aDd 
our obligations in Vietnam are to the Vietnamese people, not to a. 
particular regime. Each provides an opportunity for a reasonable 
political solution. Ea.ch reduces the risk of political reprisals 
at the end of the war. 
What I have said, up to th:ls point, is the follolling: 
(1) that we carmrl.t ourselves to disengagement; (2) that we 
implement that canmi'b!lent by means of a phased ple.n of withdro.wal 
geared to a timetable ; and, (3) that, in planning our 'Withdrawal, 
we seek to pranote the prospects for a negotiated settlement. 
There are those who, in thelr frustration, are pressing 
for immediate, unilateral vi thdrawal. There are others, equally 
frustrated, vho suggest escalating the var again. As to both 
these suggestions, I ra1.Ge tho followil�g questions: I s  it :1ot 
possible that either course could me-�e l�as likely a negotiated 
settlement between the pl.!rt.i P,�; that either cour::.>e could mean 
an inevitahle continuation of the var; that either might open 
the vey for e blood bath in South Vietnam; that �ith�r could d�� 
the prospects for a free choice by the South Vietnamese pdople ? 
Our po-..er to influence the ahape of post-war Vietnam 
seems 11.mi ted to the way :i.n which ve deaide to disengage . An 
abrupt and precipitato diseneageaent co11ld leave chaos behind 
us. To the extent that we can avoid that result, we should try. 
A scheduled plan for wi thdrswa1 of .American forces neans that 
the United States will make its own decirlions e..s a great country 
should-with an apprecj.ation of its own interests, with under­
standing or its enemies am concern for ita allies, end with 
the wiedan to learn from i ta pa.at mistakes. In too. � cases 
in Vietnam ve have al.loved Otlrselves to be diverted by narrow 
demands or the Saigon government end defl�cted by the uncertain 
responsea of Hanoi. He dr:i.ft.ed with events nnd reacted to 
preesures. N�w is the time for us tG ansert control over our 
own policies in pursut  of re:asonc.ble and ju:::t objecti Vt::s. 
Now i s  the time also to meke clear to the Saigon 
goTernment t.hat we will not pomi t it to veto oitr efforts t.o 
explore new \iN'l..ya to end the var. Saigon blocked the prcposed 
three-day cease-fire at the time of Ho Chi Minh' s death. We 
urged them to broaden their political base; they r��sponded by 
enlarging the cabinet, but narrowing its political base. It 
is not om- prerogative to determine the future political 
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complexion of the Saigon government , s.nd we should not let 
it be assumed that we have any fixed or irrevocable views on 
that score. 
!'here are additional steps which might enhance the 
prospects for a political settlement& agreement on a j oint 
commission on elections, to avoid a "vi.mer take all 11 election, 
feared by both sides; large-scale reform; a United States offer 
of medical aid, relief, and long-term economic e.nd teclmical 
assistance to both Vietnruns at the conclusion of a settlement. 
These are steps for the Vietnamese to initiate, not for us to 
impose . 
I do not assume that the suggestions I have made would 
guarantee illmediate acceptance by the North Vietnamese and the 
National Liberation Front or by the Saigon government. But I 
believe that, taken together, they could provide incentives 
for both sides in Vietnam to begin planning for an end to the 
mill tary contest. 
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SFlUTOll B::.JMUJW �. MUSlIE 
.;:, ·t. 
Uni venit7 of 1onnea�& 
lt�llo ,  Tonneseect 
October 16, 1969 
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Yeaton..,., October 15th, ll1BJl1 thouser..d of Ali\Grioane 
expressed their deep oppo3ition tc tbe Vietn.em var � their 
f'crvent d�sil'O for a lasting peace. Ni:wr be.fore, in the histc>ry 
ot the Unitod etates, he,s such an �xpres tdon. Of public COflOl)rD 
end opinion been reoorded tor ell the VOl"ld. to sett o.nd bear. 
dimension or political activism was added to t.hc �riefUl eys�. 
And yet, such an cutpolll"ing of public (l!iXp2°esrd.on for the 
welfare or $11 �n, while it may be without. pl"$cedent in ttw 
United �'tatos., mq loo�· its ultimat.o erroct unltuso its t\lndemcnte.l 
pur�'Ose in being ia sust&1118d . 
'fhie is not to oq that we must. bava other dqs Qf 
evente vill de�mine whet.her or not w m\1$"t. I believe , however, 
that '11,cfi �· ·.:�jlt-for ettect has been s.cbiovQd and vi th predictable 
Rhetoric will giw 'WY to di#logue, and deetdG or acccm-
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But beyond the reasons £or this dq of national "moratorium" 
lie even gl"9ater demonstrated needs. 
The needs to which I refer are for O\n" total national 
cc:mn.1 taent to the fundamental vurpoile s of our society. 
We have accomplished a great deal in the la.st thirty ... odd 
years. We have achieved greatness by so m� standards. But 
we have not eliminated econanic hardship tor all; we have not 
elillil'l&ted the risk of ws.r; we h&ve not provided equal justice 
for evf!ir, American. Thus, our ve.ry accomplishments serve to 
highlight our shortcomings and mistakes, and we are not satisfied. 
We are not sati sfied w1 th poJ.icies which hs.ve led us 
into our present difficulties in Southeast Asia. We are not 
satisfied with policiee which haTe not been able to stem the 
l«>rld 1 e  drift towards ever greater and costlier nuoleer ri�k f, .  
We are not satisfied with policies which d o  not quiet our fears 
and suapicions of each other . And we are not satisfied that we 
have not yet become what we hoped to become in an enlightened, 
free society. 
society? 
>.nd so ve ask question.a. Isn't that the way of a free 
Yesterday, a thoughtful and worried nation paused for a 
view of the Vietnam war. 
We are engaged in the search for a wa:y to end the fighting 
and the killing, to give the Vietnamese people the opportunity 
to work out their own political destiny-, and to lay the groundwork 
for a more appropriate United States policy in Southeast A�ia. 
Each of w; has engaged in that search in his or her own way. 
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First, and vithout equivocation, I believe we must 
disengage our !orces - in an orderly way - as soon e.s possible. 
I would hope the.t our vi thdraval program could pave 
the ws:y for a political eettl9lllent between the South Vietnem 
gOTernment, the National Liberation Front, and other groups 
representing several social and political tendencies in South 
Vietnam. To facilitate thie objective, I have edvocated that 
ve propose a standstill cease-fire to open the va:y for negotiated 
settlement e.nd a quick end to the fighting and killing. Suob 
an offer could be accompanied by a reduction in our offensive 
operations. 
I knov that many Americans, in their frustration and 
anger over Vietna11 and in their desire to end the war far the 
United States, are pressing for an immediate end mdle.teral 
vitbdraval, just as et her Americans, equally frustrated, vant 
to escalate the var again. I have serious questions about 
proposals for an immediate \d.thdrawal, and I believe escalation 
of the war would be e. tragic mistake. 
Is there not a substantial possibility that: 
Eith�r course could make less likely a negotiated 
settlement between the parties? 
Either course could mean a continuation of the war for 
the Vietnamese'? 
Either could o�n the ws:y for a blood bath in South 
Vietrumi? 
Either could dim the chances for e. tree choice by the 
South Vietnamese people? 
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I have engaged in that search as a United St�te� Senator 
who mi.de tw trips to that part ot the wrld - one ae pnrt. 
of tbe Menefield ldnsion and one ae part ot the 1967 :i:leetion 
observer a group. i'wtber, I have r.ed extensi vel7 &lld aonaul ted 
with mou who know the problean ot Vietnam intimateJ.y. 
I havEi reached aaae conclu.sione en vhat mq bo the beet 
elt�rnative strategies and polio1e:s, CODSCiOUO ot Clark Clif'.ford' e  
obffr.aUon that ''to reach a conclwd.on and to implement it are 
not tbe aaae, eepeo1ally vhen one does not bavc the ultimate 
pcver ot dec1a1on. ti 
I off.red rq conclmio;..,_a on alternatifts, not as one 
vho be.s an absolute conviction ct hiB ow intalllbillt;y, but 
as one vho wate to oontribute to a conatnictive policy tar 
OUl!"selve:a end tar the people ot Scutbeaa1. 1 .. eia. 
First, I believe our pri.!lar7 Ci>bjecti"ft - tor the 
Vietnamese � well a& for Amerio&.!l soldiers - ahould be to 
end the fighting dd k.illing in Vietnam. 
�eoODd, I believe we ehould do what we ean to advance the 
prospects tor a pol! tical "ttleaeut in Vie tBem. We should not 
de�ign or impoese that settlauat, but we. should do vh11t we 
can to make it possible. 
'third, I believe w .!llhould reexamine the :ri"tni"'e ot our 
intereste in Southeast A:da &nd tbe kind:; of off QJ"tu we oan 
prudently m.6k� to help Aa1en nationi; achieve the t)CODCmic, 
social and politioe1 atabillty tbe;y vant end need. 
'there u:e, I baliove, sewrel avoauee ve can use to 
approach these objectiveo. 
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I b�lievc thP-re are substwitia.l arg\ll'.ilents for a plan 
for disengageroent while ve continue to seek a negotiated 
settlement in Paris. Fol'ller Secretary of Defense Clerk Clifford 
has proposed e. two-step plan which would move our ground combat 
troops out by the end of 1970 and which would provide air and 
logistical support for the South Vietnemeae Army for scmewhat 
longer . Such a plan could out United States casualties and 
provide en incentive tor the South Vietname se GoverDment, the 
North Vietnam.es& and the National Liberation Front to reach a 
negoti3t.d settlement. 
A stcdstill oeaaefire and a atapd withdrawal plan 
do not rise or fall on the suooees or the other, but they could 
ninf'orce each other. Each recognize that our c<mdtment and 
our obligations in Vietnam are to the Vietnamese people, not 
to a particular regime. Each provides an opportunity for a 
reasonable poll tical solution. Each ref}uces the risk or 
political. reprisals e.t the end of the end of the war. 
Our experience in Viet-nail hae taucht u some paintul 
leaaOll8 - leeeonB ve vi.sh we Jliibt have avoided or learDed in 
a leas painful wq. 
SENATOR MUSKIE11S U THAliT PROI-0� 
oN 111ssw MD AM§YEBS". ABc NETWOJJ. oqrom 13· J.969 
8enator MuskiG ouggested that .:.oecretary General U Thli.llt 
be asked to oerve as a mediator among all the factions of South 
VletnW!l in arranging a politicw oettleme.Clt of the war. Because 
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U Thant is an Asian and bE:eause he i:l know and respected in Asia, 
he would be a natural in the role o:f a peace broker. 
Both the da.igon Goverlllfient and the Natio�al Liberation 
Front in recent initiatives have , by implication, pinpointed the 
importance of working out a political settlement in South Vietnam 
as a key element in a aettlement. The Saigon GoTernment has stated 
its willingness to talk vi.th the National Liberation Front, and 
the National Liberation Front requested direct private talks with 
the United states Paris Delegation which could only deal with 
political questions. 
Senator Muskie said, "I am certain that the only viable 
political settlement in Vietnam will be one which the South 
Vietnamese work out themselves, but a respected third party could 
pave the vey for discussions leading to such a settlement. U Thant ' s  
credentials qualify him for such c. role. I believe that it would 
be useful f<.•r our government to encourage him to assume such a 
re11pon.U bili ty. 11 
S'l'ATEMFBT BI SEIATOR !IMtJ1D S. MUSKIE 
ON THI VIS!IJM SPDCB !I PR13IDniT NIXON 
lovember 3, 1969 
The speech did not announce 8.I\'r new policy. It was the 
hope ot many .Americans that the President would give us bis plan 
tor disengagement. That plan has not materialized. 
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Although the President referred at one point to a tixed 
timetable for vi �bdrawal , which he said he could not make public, 
hie subeequent canments make it clear that it was dependent upon 
Saigon ' s  capacity to take C1Ver the war and Hanoi ' s  'Willingness 
to de-escalate the war. Such a plan, as in tbe past, leavee 
the decision as to Ailerican with:ll"awal in Saigon and in Hanoi 
rather than in Washington. 
Moreover, the President appeared to leaTe the door open 
to possible escalation of the war .  
In addition, I was disappointed that ve were not told of 
initiatives aimed at settling the political questions involved-­
quaationa which are at the heart ot &l\Y final resolution of 
the Vietna problem. 
l.lINb� IN HONOR OF 
CONGR!:SSMAN JEFFERY COHELAN 
OAKL�"iD, CALU'ORNli\ 
NOVnIBER 14, 1969 
'trhen the f'resident of the United States speaks to the 
nation on a matter of major foreign policy, � responsible 
luncrican tas an obligation to ponder the l resident1 s wu:tds, 
a.s well e.s bis deeds, most carefully. It i s  important to the 
nation that the l-resident be supported on such issues to tha 
mwd.mum possible e:r.:tent, so long as his policies appear to be 
in the best interest of thEl nation. 
I must be frank to admit that the President ' s  speech 
on VietnruJI was a great disappointment to me. At first I 
roflected on wtether that disappointment was simply the result 
of the advance build-up that he.d h::en given to the speech. This 
vas done not j ust by the prese and other media, but by the 1-l'hite 
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House itsolf, and by the leadership of the President • �;  own party� 
Clearly the nation was given reason io believe that its hopes 
for peace were Justifiabl7 high, that eignificant new steps to 
advance those hopes were about to be taken. 
But tho important issue i s  not whether I or the people 
generally were disappointed. Th� import&.nt issue is whether 
the policy expressed by the i:rcsident is sotmd. 
Regretfully I have concluded that the President' s state-
ment did not meet the m edo of the times and i s  not adequate s.nd 
did not me.rk out a clear road to peace in Vietnam nor to security 
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for the UJ:rlted States either abrosd or at hane. The President' s  
reliance upon the fact that his four predeoessorD in office, 
!residents Truman, Eli.senhower, Kennedy end Johnson, each 
expressed a strong view on the iDportanee or Indochina and 
Vietnam to the security of the United States, i s  misplaced. 
What P.reaident Nixon has a!titted is that those views were 
expressed at different times snd UDder different c1rcunatances. 
The requirements of 1969 and 1970 for the United States of 
.America are not necessarily the same as the requirements or 
the United States under President Truman in the 194C' s,  under 
President Eisenhower in the 195C ' s, or even under �esident 
Kennedy and President Johnson in the early and mid 1960 ' s. 
Many important changes have occurred both in the world 
and here at bane. Our national policy must be dynamic and 
must remain able to meet the challenge of new conditions, con­
sisteuey with the past alone, where a policy is costly, is 
little justification for continuation of the.t policy. It is 
'm:f belief that the President' s  appeal to the eo-ce.lled silent 
American majority not only misj�gea the temper of the true 
majority of the nation, but misjuiges the needs of the nation 
and of tbe world . 
We have given the South Vietnamese an opportunity to 
develop the capacity or defend themselvee .  from the United 
States there has been a huge outflow of arms, training, mone¥ 
and men, and help ot every sort. But for the South Vietnamese 
to have the capacity to defend themselves, they must have a 
Government that rallies broad aupport in South Vietnam, and 
the will to fight for their irukt;endence. As former Secretary 
of Def'unse Gliff ord, Amba:.1sador Harrinw.n, and many others have 
said, both publicly an<l ;.:.rivately, the present Govermnent of 
Scuth Vietnam has been unwilling to broaden its base snd 
make the reforms .necessary to rally th€ people. The present 
Government of South Vietn�""{; has bean unwilling to shoulder in 
aey adequate way the burden of self-defense - it has preferred , 
where possible, to fight to the last ./ll'llaricsn. 
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Moat ,\mericans want an orderly disengagement from Vietnam. 
which p�rmit3 the Sou:th Vietnamese to adjust to that disengagement 
and to prepare for naw poli ti\'.!al relationships in Vietnam. This 
aan be aocornplished onJ.y when the present South Vietna..�ese 
Government recognizes there is no room �or negotiation with 
the United States on this issue; when it is made clear to 
1residen.t 'I'hieu and Vice Pr&sident Ky that tht.::ire is no longer 
an opportunity to defer, and then defer again, American troop 
v.i thdrawals. It can only be accom:plished if the Ulli ted States 
places clear, unmistakable ,  and non egotiable requirements on 
the Govorn::-;ant of South Vietnam to take those steps necessary 
to broad<�D 1 ta base, obtain the support of the coimtryside, e.nd 
take on in fact instead of in words, the battle for its ow 
independence. 
T:'.;Gse arc- the major changee in the world as it relates 
to Vietll&Jil--the Sino-�oviet Schism, the atabilizing of South­
east Asia, the unwi.llingness of the South Vietnamese to shoulder 
their burden. The de�.tn of Ho Chi Minh, which deprived the 
.liorth Vietnamese of the;ir principal rallying point and strong 
leadership also cannot be ov&rlooked. But no change has been 
more important than those which took place in the United States 
itself. 
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In the last few years, we the richest nation in the world, 
have discovered that our resources are not unlimited--or at 
least that the willingness of the Government and the public to 
commit those resources i s  not 1m11mited. The threat to the 
dollar abroad, 'the drain or inflation at home , have placed 
severe limits on our ability as a nation to make �cial 
commitment& to solving problems which can no longer wait for 
resolution. Today we have record high interest re.tee, con­
tinuing inflation, and also groving unemployment, with no 
assurance that any of theae problems�inflation, tight money, 
or unemployment--e.re under control or even caning under control . 
Today w have citiel5 that are turning into wastelands. 
They are starving for fund.a for schools, tor housing, for 
opportunity. President Nixon baa proposed an ambitious revision 
of the welfare lava, and yet it is clear that as long as 
Vietnem is our maj or preoccupation, the funds are not available 
for that revision. 
We ea.rmot let our cities go further dovn the drain. 
We cannot let our school ayetema, once the greatest in the 
world, collapse under the v.ight ot more students, less money 
available 1 and outmoded teaching methods. We cannot continue 
to den: those who have not had an equal opportunity their 
rightful. place as Aaerioan citizens. Yet Vietnam stands in 
the way of doing what needs to be done. Our fight against 
disease, the battle to clean up our e1r and water, our progress 
toward better housing, all have been halted by" tbe buiget 
constraints reeUl.ting fr(l!I Vietnam. 
Perhaps most important, we oannot a!f'ord to see the 
values and the goals of this nation torn apart by the divisions-­
black and vbite, young and old, dove and bawk--that have shattered 
our socity in recent years. President Nixon may or may not be 
corrent in hie 'etated belief- that be speaks tor, or to, a silent 
majority--but I know he has spoken to a deepl7 concerned and 
upset cowrt17. 
I do not put this var on President Nixon' s back as 
Nixon ' s  var, ror it is the product of the enti2"e po•t-war 
develoi:aeat ot Jaerican foreign· policy. But I do put on 
President llxcm'a back the responsibility now, after ten months 
in office, to mo�e the nation in the right direction--to take 
the UD.1.ted States out ot the Vietname se War. President Nixon 
vas wrong in hie speech when be described the alternatives as 
precipitate withdrawal or hie plan-a plan which he never really 
described. 
There may be times for secrecy in the conduct of our 
nation' s affairs, but by and large this nation functions best 
out in the open, with its people well informed. My belief i s  
that President Hixon has s<:ne real choices vbioh neither require 
precipitate vithdraval nor simply asking the public to have faith 
th8.t he has sane unspecitied plan to Vietnamize the var. The 
steps I belisve should be taken, and which the President still 
oan tek.e, are as tollovs: 
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1 .  I 'believe we m\l§t disengage Our forces--in an orderly 
we,y�as eoop as possible. I believe eueh a policy is indicated 
by several considerations: our efforts have bought the South 
Vietnemese people valuable time to develop political and military 
viability . Whether or not they have developed the will and the 
capacity to shape their own future muet be tested at some point . 
There is no vsy for t15 to guarantee the existence of that via.bill t� . 
In the last analysis,  the Vietnamese people must create their 
own political leadership. The imperatives of our problems here 
at home dictate that w now leave their future in their hands 
and turn our attention to our own. 
2. l btlieye tho.£ withdrawal or ow milijlary forces shou1d 
be orderly pd phe.sed in such a way as to rlye the South Vietnamese 
people an opportupity to &dJust to it. We should make it clear to 
the government in Saigon that our llithdrawal is geared to a specific 
time frame to wh.1.ch they must edjust. The other side should be 
left in doubt--and we should reserve flexibility--as to the phasing 
out of logistical end eir support. This point, it seems to me, 
could be relevant to their motivation to negotiate. 
Even as ve plan our vitbdre.wal, it should be our objective 
to pave the way for a political settlement between the South 
Vintnem Government, the Netional Liberation Front, and other 
groups representing the several social and political tendencies 
in Vietnem. The kind of withdrawal proposal ndvanced by Former 
Secretary of Defenee Clark Clifford�of those which have been 
proposed-illustrates one vay to serve this objective. It is 
based on the assumption that we should continue to seek a 
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negotiated settl£:Smant in i?e.ris as we plen for dir.enga.gcmcnt • 
.Accordingly, Secrato.ry Clifford has proposed a two-stage pltm 
vhich would movs our ground combat troops out by the end of 1970, 
and vhich would provide air and logi sticaJ. support for somewhz.t 
longer. Such a plan, while cutting American ca::;ue.lties, could 
provide an incentive for the t>outh Vietnamese Government, the 
North Vietnsmese, and th6 National Liberation Front to re�ch 
a negotiated settlement , hopef'u1ly even before our "11. thdrawal 
is <.;.omplete . 
J .  I believe that a �talldstill cease-fir� might open 
tbe wv for a. negotiated §ettlemfill_t tmQ, a. QJ&ck_!trl<t ... ].9� 
fighting ang killing. Ttiis suggestion hP-s been re:-iisted by 
bot.h sides which 3Uf<p,;\'..sta to me ite viability. Such an offer 
could be accompanied by a reduction in our offensive operc.ltior;s. 
If the standstill cease-fire plan succee.ded, the wi thdra.weJ of 
United States forces could be accelP.r�ted as international 
:µei..ce-ke<::ping forces stepped in to insure obeervt'.ncc of th·:i 
cease-fire . lf the standstill cease-fire offer did not lead 
to an early end to the fighting, a steady end methodical v.ith­
draval plan. would offer en effective wrq of reducing United States 
involvement and comba.t losses, vhile creating the conditions 
vhich favor a political settlement. 
A standsti.1.1 cease-fire eDd a staged w1 thdrawel c} an 
do not rise or fall on the success of the other, but they could 
reinforce each other. F.ach recogni zes that our commitment and 
our obligations in Vietruun are to the Vietns.meae people, no't 
to a psrticular regime. Each provides an opportunity for a 
reasonable political solution. Each reduces the risk of 
political reprisals at the end of the war. 
In too man;y cases in Vietnam we have allowed ourselves 
to be diverted by narrow dem�nds of the Saigon Government and 
deflected by the uncertain responses of Hanoi . We drifted 
with events and reacted to pressures. Nov is the time for us 
to assert control over our own policies in pursuit of reasonable 
and just objectives .  
Uow i s  the time also to make clear to the Sti.Jc:.on 
Government that we will not permit it to veto our efforts to explore 
new vays to end the var. Saigon blocked the proposed three-dSJ" 
ceass-fire at the time of Ho Chi Mihn' s death. We urged th&m 
to broaden their political base; they responded by enlarging 
the cabinet, but narrowing its political base. It is not our -
prerogative to determine the future political complexion of the 
Saigon Government, and we should not l$t it be assumed that ve 
have any fixed or irrevocable views on that score. 
There are additional steps which might enhance the 
prospects for a political settlement: �greement on a joint 
commiaeion on elections, to avoid a "vinner t&lce ill'' election, 
feared by both sides; large-scale reform; a United States offer 
of medical aid, relief, and long-term economic and technical 
assistance to both the Vietnems at the conclusion of a 
settl8J1lent . These are steps for the Vietnamese to initiate , 
not for us to impose . 
I do not assume that the suggestions I have me.de would 
guarantee immediate acceptance by the North Vietnamese and the 
National Li ber,1tion Front or by th<? S�deon Government. But I 
believe that, taken to�ether, they could provide incentives for 
both sides in Vietn811  to begin planni ng for r.n cmd to the 
militery cont.est. 
asked to serve ap a mediator emonK-J!ll the factions of Scuth 
Vietnam in sei� the stage for e ooliti cal settlenent of the 
�· Because U Thant .• an Asian and because he is known 
respected in Asis., he wou..ld � a nature., in the rol.c of e. peace 
broker. 
Both the Saigon Gov�rment and th<=: J�a.tiont:l Li l'Cratj on 
Front in r�cont initj ativea hav0 , by inplic�ti on, pinpolnt�d 
the imµortance of working out a poli ticnl <,, : "t J em0nt in ...:cuth 
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Vietnam as a key element in a settlement. The baigon Government 
has stated its willingn1'ss to tnlk 'With th� Nationf,l Liberation. 
Front, and the tfation61 Liberation Front raquented direct 
private talks with the Unit�d Stat�s l)ari::: Delegation which 
could only deal "1th political qu<::stions. 
I am certain that the only viable :_,oli ti�aJ. settlecent 
in Vietnrun "111 be one which the South Vietnamese \.1ork out 
theMselve s ,  but e respected third pc:i.rty could ::·�\ · ·  the we.y for 
discussi ons leading to such a settlement. U Thant ' s  credentials 
qualify him for such & role. I believe that it vould be useful 
for our Gov�rnment to encourage him to �ssume such a responsibility. 
I "Want to make clear that I do not, and I do not believe 
anyone should, quarrel with the President ' s  sincerity of purpose. 
Nor do I quarrel with the sincerity of purpose of those who 
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R.dvocate either esce.latioa of the var, OJ" :llllmediate end precipitate 
\If thdr�val , or si11lply the course (it 1 t can be called that) of 
having blind faith in the President. What I do say i s  that 
those choices ere unreel and not likely to be productive. The 
steps I haveoutlined � not accanplish everything we desire, 
but I believe they provide the best wrq tor obtaining an honor­
able and secure peace in Vietnam , and a peace which i s  fully 
consistent 'With our proper interest in that pert of the world. 
Finally, one word for those who quite properly have 
exr..iressed concern about our treaty canmitments and our possible 
loss or face in the world. Any nation that bas suffered a 
quarter or a million c&sualties, as we have in Vietnam , and 
over forty thousand deaths, a1'ld spent over thirty billion dollars 
e. yt!lcr, has met its commitments. Our commitments are to assist 
South Vietnam and not to do the job ourselves. We gave much 
of ourselves &s a nation in Vietnam--e.nd in so doing we exercise 
the restraint or a great power in \IOrld leadership by not 
unleashing our full power with the horror of nuclear veapons and 
the risks or direct confrontation with the Soviet Union or 
Comnnmiat China. We need have no thought that we did not measure 
up to the rull le-Yol of our rc6poneibi11 ties and camnttments. 
Our responsibilities, r:ot.rcver, are not just to Vietnmn, 
but to ourselves e.s a nation, s.nd to all \Ibo still believe 
that in the American revolution i s  the great hope or mankind. 
Let us recogni � vh&.t our cOllmlitments truly are ,  what our 
security needs truly are, what other major neglected Problems 
wo must f aoe and aolve, and then go forward. Such a program 
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will in hi story- be judged as meeting the true demand or American 
leadership of the free world and will help create a meRningful 
p�.rtner �;hi}'.: of free men everywhere. 
RFl':J..RKS BY SENATOR EDMUND S. l-nJSKIE 
CALIFORNll\ DEMOCRATIC STATE CONVENTION 
S.l.CRJJ.:EN'l'O, 0ALIFORNIA 
J ANUAliY 23 , 1971 
As Democrats, we have an obligation, to the peopl e whose votes 
Wf) sought in November, to offC::;r new directions for the ne.tion, dlre(;tions 
which arc; clear, -which are sensible, and which the people ca.a be 
persuaded to foJ low. Thri.t means not only moving to revive our 
economy . It means aluo leaving a war we should never ha.ve entc.red. 
\.le must withdraw our troops from the jungles of Indochin�., 
for there is no lasting peace in our present policies, and there is 
no prospect in those policiBG f cr an end to the suffering of the 
people of Vietnam and Cambodia and Laos. 
I have urged that the United States set a deadline for the 
withdrawal of all our forces from Vittnam. There is reason to 
believe that such a deadline could provide the basis for e. 
negotiated settlement between North and South Vietnam. There is 
little doubt that it couJd quickly lee.d to an agreement for the 
release of .A?Dericans held prisoners-of'�war, and for the sate with-
dre.wal of all our men. 
Yet, while gradually wi thdra\ling our combat forces from 
South Vietnam, as it should , this Administration is step by step 
increasing the level of our military activities in Cambodia. and 
over the skies of North Vietnam. For example, U . S .  helicopter 
gunahips, as vell as aircraft, are now operating inside Cambodia 
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in direct support of Canbodian and South Vietnamese soldiers. 
The road out of South Vietnem does not lead through Cambodia. And 
for the Administration to pursue this course, displays an utter 
disregard, not only for the voice of Congress in foreign affairs ,  
but also for the .Administration' s O\.ln words, early last summer, 
that these military actions in Cambodia would Il.21 be lmdertaken. 
PREl'AiED ll!MABIS, SUNDAY EVDIIG 
JANUARY .31, 1971 
B.AJl'lJORD, OOHNECTICUT 
no ltt.sting peace in the poli<.:y of Viet1llaill.1 �tion and thsrG is 
Vietnamese people. It ia right of course to withdraw our combat 
forces frca �ut.h Vietnam, J.S ve are doing. But, it is wong 
to 1acreaee tbe level Of our military act1v1te:. in Cambodia and 
over the sk.iee of North Vietnam. 
Is this the plan wo were promised in. 1968? We vero told 
bt this Admini•tration last JUlle that it would !l.J DO combat 
support m.iseiona inside Cambodia. Wh&.t are we to beli�ve in 
Jen'Ul.lrJ° when the Secret817 of Def�nse ditilllis .. a this pledge as 
We have tried in the Collgresa to li1o.i t America's 
involveent ill Cambodia. And if the letter of tbe Coo}X;r-Church 
ameDdl!lent is not cleer enoUill to preserve tba_.t limit, then I 
believe we must make it cleOl". 
I believe we must llmit our militer;y presence not only 
in Cc.mbodia, but al.so in Laos a::Jd in Vietnam. Aud I believe 
ve •'18t commit �l:I'sel.ves firml.J to the cc::aplete vi�awal or 
0111" forces tr<11 Indoohina by a fixed and def'ini te date. This 
auoh ia certain-the onl.7 light at tlw end of the tunnel will be 
the one we etrike ourselves. J.nd if this Niministration does not 
ha�e the courage to strike that light, then a new coalition will. 
f'RBS� CONFER..�CE, SUNDAY AFTERNOC.l:N 
J tlmARY 31, 1971 
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 
The Ji.dministration of course deuit:B it. But it :.;oo:;ms 
to me that ve are engaged in the seme old g8Dle of assuming that 
a little more military activity might turn the tide and might 
bring us that "victoryH that has escaped us for so long. 
The first disturbing aspect of the present military 
acti Yi ty in Indochina is that 1 t departs trom :what I Wlder stood 
to be our policy. That polic7 vas firat established by the 
fresident • e  ovn restriction on the use of air power over Cambodia, 
as announced laet sumner. At that tillle ,  the President said that 
American air pover would be llmited to the interdiction of 
eupplie{; moving from Cambodia into South Vietnem. Nov, the recent 
uae of air power in th• Highva;r 4 incident went beyond vhat I 
understood to be that restriction. And I think this is 'What 
disturbs aembers or Congress. 
The other part ot our policy of course was the limitation 
on the use of ground canbat troops in Cambodia. That limitation 
vas imposed by the Cooper-Church Amendment . 
These tvo elements, the President ' s  announced limitation 
on the use of air po\oer and the Congress ' s limitation on use of 
ground combat forces ,  constituted our policy as we tmderstood it, 
with respect to .�erican military activity in Cambodia. Now that 
policy has changed , to what extent we're not yet sure. I think 
that it is appropriate that the Congr$sS inquire into the matter 
to as.certain to what extent the policy is being modified. In any 
event , whatever tl:te lim1tations whicb thf.l Auministra.tion ha:; in 
mind, the fact of the matter is, that at this point, it is escalating 
mill tary activity in Indochina. Down that road lewis further 
involvement--at least that has been the lestlon of our involvement 
in Vietnw.i for the le.st 6 or 7 years. I think we must resist it. 
I think we must stop it. 
I hope it is no longer an issue by 1972 . I hope our boys 
are h0t1e , and that the whole thing is behind m: by 1972. That 
would be my !!druthers, n to use an old Maine exprt:Jssion. 
I am looking a.t several propositions, the result of nll 
of which would oo to set a definite date for withdrawal . I 
introduced a resolution in May of this pa:-lt year vhicb would have 
made the eod of 1971 or January 1, 1972 , the deadline for with­
drawal. Lt that time it would h�.ve been about 18 months. This 
date still looks like a gocd deadline. And might I remind us all, 
thht if that deadline were met, we vould have been involved in 
the war in Indochina for as long after tho 1968 election as we 
were before. And it seems thet we werB told that it we.s too long 
at that tim$. 
Rl!l1.ARK� BY SENATOR Ell'1UND S. MUSKIE 
UNIT� J E!AISH APfli:AL 
CLEVELAND, OHiu 
WEDNESDAY, February 10, 1971 
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I sav the pictures their children have drawn and hung on 
the walls of these veI71 same shelters -- pictures 'With no explo5ives 
in them , no airplanes or tanks, no people 'with gWls. 'Ihey a.re 
pictures of peace - of the land and of the things they gro\l on 
the land, of birds in the sky, and of people at vork or at rest. I 
am convinced we muet do all we can to help make these pictures come 
true .  
